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Abstract
Why do some rebel groups engage in acts of sexual violence while others do not,
and what accounts for variation over time? The existing literature suggests that sexual
violence should be less common among strong and cohesive groups and more preva-
lent in weak, disorganized groups. Because preliminary research in this field focused on
systemic-level factors, only recently have some scholars begun to include rough measures
of organizational dynamics in quantitative studies, and no one has yet linked multiple
measures of rebel strength to a comprehensive dataset on wartime sexual violence. This
thesis does so for the first time, and finds a pattern inconsistent with previous claims,
showing a positive association between rebel strength and sexual violence across multiple
measures in cross-rebel analyses. Case studies on the All Tripura Tiger Force and the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia provide insight into how this relationship operates,
and which organizational characteristics especially predispose a group to use or refrain
from sexual violence. The finding that stronger rebel groups have a higher propensity
toward sexual violence, controlling for numerous variables such as pre-war conditions
and intensity of fighting, holds important policy implications for international organiza-
tions. Human rights groups may seek to preemptively intervene in conflicts and locations
that pose a distinctive risk to the civilian population, especially where hierarchical and
well-armed rebels control territory in areas outside of their support base.
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Some time in June 1990 after NPFL fighters took control of Kakata, a group of
them came to our house. . . Four of them arrested me and tied my hands at my back.
Then they led me behind the house where two of the fighters raped me, set the house
on fire, released me and left. . . I conceived as a result of the first abuse and gave
birth to a boy. The child died at the age of two. . . During the April 6, [1996] fighting,
I was again raped by three NPFL fighters on the Old Road. I again conceived as
a result of this gang rape. I gave birth to the child who is now eight years old and
with me here in the camp.1
— Liberian refugee
In the early 1990s, accounts of mass rapes and other sexual abuses connected to
campaigns of ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Yugoslavia propelled the topic of sexual
violence onto the international scene. Subsequent war crime tribunals called by the United
Nations heightened public and scholarly attention on its incidence, causes, and effects on
populations. Condemned by international organizations as a war crime that holds serious
implications for global security as well as the creation and maintenance of peace, sexual
violence has occurred across a range of locations and under diverse conditions in recent
civil wars.
Still, for every former Yugoslavia, where armed forces raped approximately 20,000
women and where some scholars argue sexual violence was employed as a “weapon of war,”
1TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 198 (Foster et al. 2009, 248).
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there are nearly tenfold the number of conflict-years with low-to-nonexistent incidence
rates (Cohen and Nord˚as 2014). Of 207 rebel groups active between 1989 and 2009,
only 35 were ever reported to have committed sexual violence. That is, research in
sexual violence must be what can explain its incidence as well as its absence. For every
combatant who opportunistically engages in rape, or each commander who orders the
use of sexual violence to terrorize a population, there are many more situations in which
there is no observed sexual violence. This thesis will analyze how the leadership of rebel
groups may explicitly prohibit sexual violence, organizational norms may make it less
likely, or groups may share goals or identities with the local population that discourage
civilian victimization.
There is no consensus on why or which armed groups commit sexual violence during
conflicts—some scholars view it as a product of anarchy or dysfunctional group control,
and others as a product of hierarchy and strategic decision-making. Analyses shift their
attention from security conditions to ethnic breakdowns within states, or from the com-
batant on the ground to leaders. These approaches deserve further consideration in light
of the creation of cross-rebel datasets that allow us to conduct systematic statistical anal-
yses on a variety of factors relating to armed groups during times of war (Cunningham,
Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013; Gleditsch et al. 2002a; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010;
Raleigh et al. 2010). Research on wartime sexual violence faces unique difficulties due
to the nature of the phenomenon, as it may leave behind living victims rather than dead
bodies, usually lacks the public spectacle of terrorism, and goes underreported even in
peacetime. Dara Cohen and Ragnhild Nord˚as’ dataset (2014), Sexual Violence in Armed
Conflict, attempts to fix this measurement problem, following the trend toward quantita-
tive analyses by creating measures of sexual violence perpetration that draw from multiple
sources. Identifying the factors that explain the use or absence of sexual violence has been
the subject of numerous studies since the 1990s, but no one has used the SVAC yet to
probe the importance of organization-level, rather than systemic, factors. This thesis will
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employ a mixed methods approach to examine the relationship between the phenomenon
and the strength of rebel groups, an important organization-level characteristic that re-
flects a group’s ability to recruit, control members, govern civilians, manage the use of
violence, and survive over time (Weinstein 2007, 42–45).
Therefore, this thesis begins by addressing a current gap in the literature through
the focus on organization-level factors to explain rebel groups’ propensity for wartime
sexual violence. Using several measurements of rebel strength, drawn from a dataset
neglected by the sexual violence literature until this point, I find a positive association
between sexual violence and strength. Contrary to claims from the literature, weaker
and disorganized groups show lower propensities for sexual violence than stronger and
more organized groups do. I then explore the mechanisms that may be at play in this
correlation, using dual case studies of “weak” and “strong” rebel organizations to test
whether hierarchy, instrumentalized violence, accountability, and reporting biases mediate
the relationship between strength and sexual violence. For the All Tripura Tiger Force, a
small rebel group from India’s northeast, I find that egalitarian cultural norms confounded
the relationship between organizational strength and sexual violence, both undermining
the hierarchy of the group and discouraging the perpetration of sexual violence. In the
case of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, I find support for the moderating effect
that controlling and moving combatants into unfamiliar territories may have on sexual
violence. In sum, this thesis focuses on group-level factors and finds a robust and positive
relationship between strength and sexual violence, which challenges current assumptions
about which rebel groups have higher propensities for sexual violence.
1.1 Scope
This section defines the scope of sexual violence as it is used in this paper, outlining
the types of acts that constitute sexual violence as well as its perpetrators and victims.
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Acts. The term “sexual violence” encompasses a broad repertoire of actions that are
difficult to define in peacetime, no less during armed conflicts.
To begin, in international law rape refers to the physical penetration of a person
committed by force, by threat of force, under coercion, or in situations that show an
abuse of power or an ability to consent (ICC 2011). This is the subset most discussed in
the literature on wartime sexual violence and the most commonly observed within and
across conflicts. Recent truth commissions on the civil wars in Guatemala and Peru, for
example, demonstrated that rape was the primary form of sexual abuse perpetrated by
state militaries, paramilitaries, police, and civil patrols, comprising 84 percent and 48
percent of all reported instances of sexual violence, respectively.
Other subsets of sexual violence classified by the ICC in the Rome Statute as war
crimes include “sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, [and] enforced
sterilization,” and Wood notes the occurrence of mutilation and non-penetrating sexual
assault during wartime as well (ICC 1998, 5; Wood 2006, 298). This analysis relies on
the definition used in Cohen’s SVAC dataset: rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, forced sterilization or abortion, sexual mutilation, and sexual torture
(Cohen and Nord˚as 2014, 419).
Within individual armed conflicts the repertoire of sexual violence may vary sub-
stantially, revealing the different causes and motivations behind its perpetration. As an
example, during Sierra Leone’s civil war many Revolutionary United Front combatants
violated the group’s Code of Conduct by raping civilians, and to combat this indiscrimi-
nate rape and increase its control over combatants the group endorsed forced marriages
(Marks 2013, 362–67). Additionally, its leader, Foday Sankoh, ordered one of his alleged
wives to be sexually tortured in public:
The RUF rounded up about seventy of us civilians, including Abi and Janneh,
and accused us of making a plot to arrest Sankoh. . . The rebels grabbed [Jan-
neh], stripped her and threw her down in front of the whole village. Several of
them pulled her legs apart and held her tightly. They poured a pan of boiling
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palm oil into her vagina and then into her ears. . . The rebels said they were
sent by Sankoh who was living in Kailahun about seven miles. Nothing small
or big happened without his knowledge. (HRW 2003, 33–34)
During this single conflict the Human Rights Watch also documents numerous instances
of forced incest, forced pregnancy, mutilation of pregnant women, forced abortion, and
sexual slavery (HRW 2003). In this way, empirical studies show how a broad repertoire of
sexual violence can be employed by different actors for diverse purposes, sometimes as a
product of opportunism, a means to increase group cohesion, punishment, or to terrorize
and control the civilian population.
Societal gender norms constrain the types of sexual practices deemed acceptable in
times of peace, and peacetime conventions in turn influence the logic of wartime practices.
Therefore, it is important to reflect on cultural differences regarding gender relations and
sex when we consider acts of sexual violence in wartime—not to excuse perpetrators of
abuses, but to better distinguish what motivates certain types of sexual violence. A survey
conducted by the International Center for Research on Women provides an example of
cultural differences in gender roles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that may
complicate Western definitions employed in this paper. The survey, conducted in the
DRC’s North Kivu province, suggested a societal acceptance of gender-based violence as
well as a conception of rape that differs substantially from the definition employed by
the ICC and the SVAC; of the approximately 700 adult men interviewed, 64.9 percent
agreed that “women should accept partner violence to keep the family together,” and 42.7
percent agreed that “if a woman doesn’t show physical resistance when forced to have
sex, it’s not rape” (Slegh et al. 2012, 9). Because cross-national studies of sexual violence
incorporate a range of societal attitudes toward gender equality and sex that may not
always align with the definitions employed by international actors, understanding these
cultural differences provides a more complete picture of decision-making processes and
constraints that this dataset may not be able to. Using a prior example, such analysis
would be helpful in discerning how the RUF leadership viewed its combatants’ wanton
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rape of civilians as something entirely distinct from its decision to force captured girls
and women into marriage with its fighters, for instance (Marks 2013, 367).
Perpetrators. When examining who commits wartime sexual violence, key factors to
consider are the number, group membership, rank, motivations, and gender of the per-
petrators.
Although this thesis focuses on rebel organizations, rebels are not the only actors
who perpetrate sexual violence, or necessarily the most violent. Rather, there is extensive
documentation showing the bilateral production of violence in civil wars, as both rebel
groups and state security forces target civilians during conflicts (Kalyvas 2006). Dara
Cohen’s dataset on rape in civil wars between 1980 and 2009 demonstrates that in 62
percent of the cases both states and rebels committed rape, in 31 percent of the cases only
the government did, and that in a mere 7 percent were rebel groups the sole perpetrators
(Cohen 2013a, 467).
Within armed groups, responsibility for the perpetration of sexual violence resides
at multiple levels. Some scholars, often assuming a “weapon of war” theory of the pro-
duction of violence, employ a principal-agent framework to analyze how the relationship
between the principal (commanders) and the agent (combatants) influences violent out-
put, viewing sexual violence as a strategic decision incentivized or disincentivized by
unit commanders and the hierarchy of an armed organization. Other scholars view com-
batants as primarily responsible for violent output, imagining a wartime breakdown of
societal mechanisms for inhibiting violence against civilians that results in opportunistic,
widespread, and senseless violence. Even further, most international actors acknowledge
the culpability of commanders who tolerate or fail to prevent acts of violence against
civilians. Assigning responsibility for the perpetration of rape becomes even more com-
plicated when considering situations in which soldiers were abducted or directly ordered
to rape with the threat of violence if not compliant. Various theories of hierarchy and
anarchy thus designate responsibility to different echelons within the command chain of
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rebel and state armed forces, which indicates a case-by-case complexity to assigning blame
for sexual violence and the importance of recognizing both the physical perpetrators as
well as others who share the responsibility for it.
In the relevant literature there has recently been a focus on the gender and number
of participants and how this relates to combatant socialization and armed group cohesion.
In spite of popular perceptions of the phenomenon, both women and men engage in
wartime sexual violence. Women occupy significant roles within many rebel and state
armed forces, including the role of combatants who, motivated by similar intra-group
dynamics and pressures, participate in and direct sexual violence against civilians in
company with their male peers (Cohen 2013b). If rape is conceived of as a way to inflict
psychological damage on both the victim and the broader civilian population, the rape
of men by women within the context of patriarchal societies—in violation of traditional
power relations between men and women—may prove especially humiliating. Women or
men do not always perpetrate their sexual violence alone; on the contrary, gang rape is
relatively more common in wartime than in peace. Psychologists and sociologists find that
rape can build camaraderie among combatants, and some have found correlations between
low preexisting levels of social cohesion and rape by multiple perpetrators, theorizing that
it is strategically employed to build loyalty among fighters and to the organization (Cohen
2013a, 464).
In addition, times of war can disrupt an otherwise-healthy rule of law and law
enforcement system, providing an environment of near impunity in which perpetrators
may be not be tightly linked to the dominant cleavage of the conflict but rather acting out
of private interests. In such “anarchic” environments, sexual violence can be perpetrated
by pro-government militias, foreign mercenaries, the security forces of an intervening
state, peacekeepers, and civilians acting independently and opportunistically. Examining
the role of dysfunctional inhibiting control mechanisms and conducting empirical analyses
are key towards a more complete typology of wartime sexual violence. To victims, whether
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or not their rapists were officially part of the dyadic conflict captured in the SVAC is not
likely of great importance, but rather the characteristics of the wartime society that
enabled the violence.
Victims. Victims of wartime sexual violence are both men and women, though women
are disproportionately affected (Leiby 2009). Past studies have focused on how victims
may be targeted due to their religious, racial, or ethnic identities, as well as their gender.
Those affected by sexual violence are typically civilians, but it is sometimes employed
by and against members of an armed group. Sexual assault may arise from rituals and
hazing that are tolerated, or at least not prohibited by, a group’s hierarchy. In addition,
women serving as combatants or in other functions within a rebel group’s hierarchy may
be forced into marriages or sexual slavery. In the case of the National Patriotic Front of
Liberia, some women who were originally taken by combatants as “bush wives,” or sexual
slaves, would go on to fight for the group.
Sexual violence produces profound long-term effects on its victims. Survivors of
sexual violence often face stigma or alienation from their communities and have difficulty
finding partners (Foster et al. 2009, 251). Some become pregnant and have the children
of their rapists, and they may be unprepared to care for these children. Other women
face reproductive injuries that would prevent them from having children in the future, or
are given sexually transmitted infections. Many survivors of rape, sexual enslavement,
forced abortions, or other traumatizing situations are left with psychological effects like
post-traumatic stress disorder, and they are at an increased risk for suicide (Nock and
Kessler 2006).
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1.2 Literature over Time
To briefly sketch the literature on wartime sexual violence, with the publicity from
the ICTY and ICTR in the early to mid-1990s came a surge of scholars who saw them-
selves as finally discussing this “public secret” and giving it an academic standing (Niar-
chos 1995; Nordstrom 1996; Stiglmayer 1994). These early studies examined the gendered
dynamics of conflicts, the relationship between peacetime inequalities and wartime rape,
and first posited the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. Ruth Seifert, for example,
hypothesized that rape simply belongs under the “rules of the game,” a wartime tool
that encourages the production of masculinity and provides tactical advantages (1994).
More generally, Inger Skjelsbæk divided the approaches of the 1990s into three camps:
the essentialists, who saw sexual violence used strategically in the warzone against all
women to reinforce militaristic masculinity (Allen 1996; Brownmiller 1975; Copelon 1995;
MacKinnon 1994; Seifert 1994); the structuralists, who used identity to explain why cer-
tain subgroups of women are targeted during conflicts (Meznaric 1994); and the social
constructionists, who analyze both men and women as victims and perpetrators, and
argue that sexual violence reaffirms the masculinity of the perpetrator and the feminin-
ity of the victim (Zarkov 1998). Despite their epistemological differences, these early
contributions to the literature produced explanations primarily based on the atrocities
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, two mass and ethnically-motivated cases that are
outliers in the observance of wartime sexual violence (Leiby 2009, 446–447). In the fol-
lowing decade, the debate would morph into one over the strategic or the opportunistic
use of violence, with competing theories of hierarchy and anarchy and many applications
of the principal-agent framework. The following chapter will detail what the most promi-
nent current theories suggest about the relationship between organizational strength and
sexual violence perpetration.
Introduction 10
1.3 Roadmap and Relevance
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 2 outlines prominent theories in
the field and their predictions for the relationship between strength and sexual violence.
Chapter 3 details the empirical strategy that will be employed to test this relationship in
Chapter 4, where results shows a positive and robust correlation between strength and
sexual violence. Based on these models, Chapter 5 indicates what the causal mechanisms
may be that underlie this association, which are then tested through case studies of the
All Tripura Tiger Force and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia in Chapters 6 and
7. Finally, Chapter 8 presents concluding remarks on the case studies, summarizes core
findings, and details policy implications.
Research in this subject is important because sexual violence has long-lasting and
devastating impacts on the lives of victims. Prior to the creation of the SVAC, anal-
ysis that could explain cross-rebel variation in sexual violence was limited, with most
quantitative research on civilian abuses instead focusing on homicides, which are easier
to observe and quantify. Studies show that lethal violence is disproportionately directed
at men, whereas sexual violence primarily affects women (Plu¨mper and Neumayer 2006;
Carpenter 2006; Leiby 2009). As Cohen notes, it is “both uncertain and unlikely” that
theories developed to explain the lethal victimization of men would fit for explaining
sexual violence against women (2013a). In addition to responding to the need for more
quantitative research on sexual violence, my research is also important because current
systemic explanations for wartime sexual violence, or those that reduce sexual violence
to a weapon of war, cannot explain variation within conflicts and over time. Wood has
argued that “the way forward” in the study of this phenomenon is a turn toward the
internal dynamics of organizations (2010, 299). I measure one such internal dynamic,
strength, and use quantitative and qualitative analysis to find its relationship to sexual
violence. Although a group’s relative strength can be endogenous to the system in which
it is formed, it can also reflect an organization’s ability to attract and control members,
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internal cohesion, hierarchy, and bureaucratic capacity. How these factors influence the
perpetration of sexual violence is the focus of this thesis. My quantitative findings suggest
that strength is positively associated with sexual violence, in contrast to the suggestions
of other studies. Through exploratory case studies, I propose that rebel strength can
decrease accountability to civilians and the leadership, and that cultural norms impact
both the expression of a group’s hierarchy as well as sexual violence.
Chapter 2
Theory
This chapter details the relationship between organizational strength and sexual
violence predicted by prior scholarship. Studies generally suggest that stronger rebel
groups who are more capable of controlling their combatants commit less sexual violence.
In earlier examinations of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, some studies framed
sexual violence as a matter of pure opportunism. Scholars and non-experts viewed rape as
an inevitable byproduct of war because conflicts break down monitoring and disciplinary
mechanisms, and most combatants will exploit this if given the chance. Mueller (2000),
when considering the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, rejected the notion that they were
truly motivated by ethnicity and rather posited that the violence had been led by “bands
of opportunistic marauders. . . drawn from street gangs or from bands of soccer hooligans,”
and that the Hobbesian conditions in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda “came about
not because people generally gave into murderous enmity, but because they came under
the arbitrary control of armed thugs” (2000, 42, 62). According to this point of view,
there would be a higher opportunity to commit sexual violence within groups that lacked
the ability to monitor and punish their combatants.
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Much of the recent literature on general forms of civilian abuse also predicts an
inverse relationship between organizational control and one-sided violence. In their anal-
ysis of the warring factions within Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) find
that internal characteristics of armed groups can better explain levels of abuse than ties
to communities or contestation between factions. Their analysis of that conflict suggests
that the groups with a higher propensity for civilian abuse were those with “chaotic,
disorganized internal structures,” characterized as those who could not or chose not to
enact disciplinary sanctions for actions that violated group policies or norms (2006, 445).
However, scholars like Cohen (2013a) and Elisabeth Wood (2009) argue that sexual
violence represents a phenomenon distinct from other forms of civilian abuse, especially
in the differences between lethal and nonlethal forms of violence. As an example of how
sexual violence may not vary directly with general levels of civilian targeting and may
even be absent amidst large-scale victimization, Wood notes that although the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam perpetrated abuses like the ethnic cleansing of Muslims and
massacres of Sinhalese peoples, they committed almost no sexual violence (2009).
Looking at research that takes sexual violence as the dependent variable, then, the
studies of Butler et al. (2007), Wood (2009), and Cohen (2013a) are notable for their
attention to dynamics of control and cohesion, and all predict with slightly different mech-
anisms and proxy variables that stronger groups should see less sexual violence. The study
by Butler et al. (2007) of government security forces in 2003 examines a combination of
systemic and organizational characteristics that supported this relationship. Proposing
that sexual violence in government forces “is driven by out-of-control agents,” the authors
find that when discipline is lax and there is an absence of accountability or monitoring
of human rights abuses, government forces were more likely to perpetrate sexual violence
(673). Wood (2009) also discusses the relationship between accountability and sexual
abuses. She argues that the absence of sexual violence by the LTTE can be explained by
the group’s explicit prohibition of non-marital sex and the rape of nonspouses, both of
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which reflected Tamil cultural values, in combination with a strong hierarchical control
that could easily punish infractions (2009). She goes further, though, and suggests that
sexual violence would still have been rare even without the Tamil cultural norm against
rape because of the group’s extreme forms of punishments, high degree of centralization,
and effective surveillance of operational units (149–51). Were this relationship to hold,
decentralized groups with high information asymmetries between leaders and combatants
would have higher propensities for violence, all else equal.
Cohen (2013a) focuses on internal cohesion rather than organizational slack yet
finds a similar relationship. Extreme forms of forced recruitment, such as abduction and
pressganging, but not weaker forms like coercion or conscription, are shown to be posi-
tively associated with rape. Cohen argues that groups comprised of abducted combatants
have lower levels of social cohesion and that this makes rank-and-file combatants, who
want to assert their status and bond with other members, more likely to participate in
“costly group behavior” like gang rape (2013a, 465). In this paradigm, groups that at-
tract recruits because of civilian support or through financial incentives are less likely
to rape, as are groups that could create internal cohesion through political education,
discipline, military training, or other forms of socialization, even absent civilian support
or salaried combatants (Hoover Green 2015).
To summarize, most recent literature on civilian abuse assumes that stronger groups
have lower propensities for violence. This reflects the view that violence is primarily a
function of organizational slack or anarchy in which stronger groups, held accountable by
outside observers or their constituency, realize the costliness of violence against civilians
and only employ it strategically. The theories outlined above view a rebel group’s ability
to monitor, discipline, and create cohesion as key components of its strength. In the
following chapter I will expand upon how to define and measure the strength of an armed
group. This will allow me to test whether it is correlated with sexual violence by using a
dataset focusing on recent civil wars, and to determine the direction of the correlation.
Chapter 3
Empirical Strategy
Prior studies suggest that weak armed groups have higher propensities for wartime
sexual violence, but few have used cross-rebel data to evaluate these claims (Cohen 2013a;
Hoover Green 2015). The following analysis will test the correlation between notions of
strength and sexual violence, though will not be able to prove the causal direction. This
chapter details how I operationalize the concept of strength, the scope of the analysis,
and the data and methods employed.
3.1 Motivations
The Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset captures yearly variation in sexual
violence perpetration by armed groups as well as the relative magnitude of these abuses.
It is useful for observing the forms of sexual violence employed in specific years, as well
as for comparing the use or non-use of various armed groups within conflicts. However,
the dataset does not provide information about the groups who perpetrated these abuses
beyond their name and location. Quantitatively examining the components of strength
for rebel groups builds upon recent theories and typologies about how the structure, insti-
tutions, and internal workings of organizations may relate to their violent output (Cohen
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2013a; Hoover Green 2015; Wood 2010). Most prominent is Cohen’s 2013 study on rape
in civil wars that uses forced recruitment as a proxy for unit cohesion and suggests that
less cohesive groups have higher propensities for wartime rape. The SVAC can easily
be combined with the Non-State Actor dataset, which provides data on several internal
characteristics of armed groups, including their relative strength, ability to challenge the
government in military engagements, territorial holdings, and degree of central control
(Cunningham et al. 2013). The characteristics quantified by the NSA provide an alterna-
tive to Cohen’s measure of unit cohesion for proxying organizational control and strength,
which I detail in the following section. Fundamentally this study analyzes whether a cor-
relation exists between these various conceptualizations of strength and sexual violence,
and what its direction is.
3.2 Explanatory Variables
For the purposes of this thesis, “strength” is defined as the ability to overcome
incentive problems to organization and to challenge the armed forces of the government
(Weinstein 2007). Applying economic theories of organization to rebel groups, Weinstein
lists five challenges to organization that rebel leaders confront: recruitment, control,
governance, how to employ violence, and resilience (2007, 42–45). The three main ex-
planatory variables that follow capture these elements of organizational strength.
Central control. The degree of central control exercised by a rebel group’s leader-
ship represents its strength by means of its ability to monitor combatants, manage the use
of violence, and ensure the group’s longevity. Before rebel groups can control territory or
a country, their leaders have to be able to control their own members, who may not share
in their goals for rebelling. At the lowest tier of the organization, combatants may join
the group voluntarily or involuntarily and hold incongruous motivations for participation
among themselves; they may have been forcibly recruited and indoctrinated as children,
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view rebellion as a profitable alternative to civilian life, or participate to correct per-
ceived political or economic grievances (Beber and Blattman 2013; Collier and Hoeffler
2004). Commanders must combat low unit cohesion and the possibility of desertion and
defection by reducing information asymmetries and increasing control over their subordi-
nates, which could take the form of discipline, rewards, socialization, or political training
(Hoover Green 2015). Further up the hierarchy, executive committees need to ensure the
loyalty of regional commanders, and the head of the organization endeavors to prevent
fractionalization of the group either through incorporating the opinions of the executive
committee or eliminating the source of dissent.
Territorial control. Territorial control represents a group’s ability to govern, its
resilience, and its bureaucratic capacity. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan have sug-
gested that insurgent territorial control is best categorized as a form of defensive strength,
as it involves the ability to elude the government and its repression (2009, 575). However,
I propose a shift in attention from the dyad toward internal dynamics and constituency.
Increased distance from the capital, rough terrain, and non-contiguity may lower the
threshold with which rebels can assume control of territory, and this variable likely sub-
sumes some elements of military strength, because rebels may gain effective territorial
control by blocking government access. When insurgents gain territorial control, how-
ever, and then retain it over the course of the conflict, governance systems may emerge to
maintain control over the civilian population. High values of territorial control, indicating
a group held territory for a large portion of the conflict, will therefore proxy a group’s
bureaucratic capacity, resilience over time, and the degree of control it exercises over its
constituency, whether by fear or by the provision of social services.
Relative Strength. We can also imagine a more straightforward notion of rebel
strength defined as a rebel group’s military capabilities comparative to the government.
Relative capacity also encompasses a rebel group’s ability to procure arms, mobilize civil-
ians for their cause, and fight against the government’s armed forces. Militarily strong
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rebels in general have larger forces and greater control over them. However, this variable
can be obscured by a particularly strong government military or exaggerated by a weak
state, and in the next section I detail the importance of controlling for such pre-conflict
differences in state capacity. In addition, measuring strength reveals more information
about relationships to civilians than absolute strength does. Conceptually, the relative
strength of the government to the rebel group indicates a barrier between (i) the rebel
leadership and its members and (ii) the rebel leadership and its constituency. Relatively
strong governments, assuming an even spatial distribution of the state apparatus, indi-
rectly thwart rebel recruitment attempts through creating the economic conditions for
high employment rates or the provision of services that decrease incentives for joining and
supporting the rebellion. Relatively weak rebel groups, all else equal, will be unable to
lure the skilled commanders of the government security forces or its technocrats to their
organization.
Other Variables. Variables omitted from the main analysis that are independently
evaluated later against sexual violence include relative capabilities to mobilize, procure
arms, and fight. As noted above, a group’s military strength in comparison to the govern-
ment encompasses its ability to procure arms and fight, and the ability to recruit civilians
to its cause may be captured by controlling territory and relative strength.
3.3 Control Variables
Past research indicates that intra-state conflicts are more likely to occur in poor,
weak, and politically unstable states (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Favorable economic con-
ditions in particular increase the opportunity costs of initiating and continuing rebellions.
In addition, bureaucratically weak states with low degrees of political institutions are less
able to constrain the actions of their citizens and mete out discipline for breaking the
law. To some extent then, pre-conflict levels of sexual violence will be a function of the
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state’s ability to hold citizens accountable for violations of the law, and existing societal
norms will influence the degree and repertoire of sexual violence employed by a group.
The control of commanders over their combatants may therefore be endogenous to the
country where the group operates. The following analysis will thus control for wealth and
state capacity.
Other factors that may be associated with the perpetration of sexual violence are
the length of the conflict and the intensity of fighting. Some studies suggest that longer
conflicts are bloodier, and controlling for the length of the conflict helps us distinguish
groups that sustained sexual violence over decades from isolated reports in short-lived
insurgencies (Cunningham 2006). In addition, we should control for the yearly intensity
of fighting to distinguish sexual violence from other forms of abuses against civilians, and
from general levels of wartime activity.
3.4 Scope
This analysis uses data on the sexual violence employed by 208 rebel groups ac-
tive in intra-state conflicts between 1989 and 2009. The original SVAC includes 7,286
conflict-actor-year observations across 129 conflicts. Conflicts included are those the
UCDP/PRIO’s Armed Conflict Dataset defines as active between 1989 and 2009, or at
one point no more than five years before 1989 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010). Armed
conflicts are defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or ter-
ritory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25
battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state”
(Gleditsch et al. 2002b, 618–619). Because the focus remains conflicts in which one or
more rebel group within a country fights against the government, and the NSA dataset
is limited to civil wars, I exclude interstate conflicts (type=2) and internationalized in-
ternal armed conflicts (type=4) from the analysis. Still, it would be useful to examine in
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further studies how the behavior of rebel groups may differ in internationalized internal
armed conflicts when they receive greater external backing or face an opponent with even
stronger military capabilities.
Recent studies have examined the role of state security forces in sexual violence,
but the quantitative analysis will consider states only secondarily, through the inclusion
of variables that describe the relative strength of rebel groups (Leiby 2009; Butler et
al. 2007). In addition to states, the original dataset also includes perpetration data for
rebel groups and pro-government militias. Although an analysis of the characteristics of
pro-government militias would be a valuable contribution to understanding the various
actors who perpetrate wartime sexual violence, current organization-level data for PGMs
is limited to troop size and this thesis focuses on opposition to the government (Carey
et al. 2013). Where organization-level data is available for “interim” years, many of
which represent lower-scale fighting rather than a true cessation of hostilities, the relevant
observations are included from the SVAC. The five post-conflict years provided for each
warring dyad in the SVAC are excluded unless there were discrepancies in the end date
between the versions of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset used by the SVAC
and NSA.1 The Non-State Actors data cannot account for changes to group strength
and structure that follow the termination of conflicts, whether this occurs because of
factionalization, merging with another group, outright defeat, power-sharing agreements,
or low activity. Of 984 observations, 85 (8.6 percent) are interim years, representing 33
groups. Typically these pertained to long-lived insurgencies which saw battle deaths drop
below the inclusion rate of 25 per year.
1The appendix provides more information on data modifications.
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3.5 Data
Dependent Variables. The SVAC dataset captures the prevalence of sexual violence
using three different sources: US State Department annual reports, prev state, Human
Rights Watch reports, prev hrw, and Amnesty International reports, prev ai. The four-
point scale used by each of these measures can be quickly summarized as 0 (no reported
sexual violence), 1 (isolated reports of sexual violence), 2 (widespread or frequent sexual
violence), and 3 (systematic sexual violence, used tactically). The SVAC also captures
other descriptions of sexual violence where it occurs, such as the type used, criteria that
weighed into the selection of victims, the identity of the victim, and the timing and
location of attacks, which do not factor into this quantitative analysis due to their low
incidence and missing values.
From the data provided in the SVAC, I measure sexual violence in two ways. First,
to describe rebel groups’ average tendencies for sexual violence, I use the yearly rate of
perpetration, variable sv, and a cross-sectional form of the SVAC. Although this weights
isolated reports of sexual violence equal to widespread and systematic abuses at the year,
it reveals the proportion of years in which a group either ordered or failed to prevent
these abuses from occurring, and is useful for distinguishing between isolated occurrences
and groups who continually targeted civilians. Second, to allow the possibility of changes
in strategies, strength, and organization over time, the time-series cross-sectional data
measures sexual violence using sv2, a dichotomous measure of perpetration for a given
year. In these ways, the data can be used both to examine differences across rebel groups
and conflicts as well as intra-group changes over time.
Variables sv and sv2 are coded on the maximum value of the three sources provided
in the SVAC. Although the State Department reports are only missing five observation-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































account for 17, and the Human Rights Watch is missing 209 (21.2 percent of observa-
tions). Coding the maximum value over the sources hopes to correct for the two primary
drawbacks of the dataset: (i) the limited method of data collection, in which research as-
sistants restricted their coding only to what was found within these three sources’ annual
reports, and (ii), varying interest in sexual violence over time that biases toward report-
ing larger-scale atrocities and possibly to including mentions of sexual violence in other
conflicts in their aftermath. With this pattern of missing data in the dependent variable,
I propose that Type II errors are more likely than false reports that sexual violence oc-
curred when it actually did not. Therefore, variable sv collapses the prevalence scores
into a dichotomous measure of whether or not sexual violence occurs, takes its yearly
maximum, and then reports the mean over the duration it is included in the dataset.
Variable sv2 is simply the maximum measure of whether or not a group perpetrated
sexual violence in a year—if one of the three sources reported even some sexual violence,
sv2 takes the value of 1.
Explanatory Variables. To proxy organizational strength and control, I use a set of
variables derived from the Non-State Actors Dataset. Ordinal variable Central Control
measures the degree of control exercised by a group’s central command and is measured as
0 (no central command structure), 1 (low central strength), 2 (medium central strength),
and 3 (high central strength) until its collapse on the mean for the cross-rebel analysis
(Cunningham et al. 2013, 523). According to the authors of the dataset, it measures
the central command’s ability to control the day-to-day life of its forces as well as of
the “constituent groups of an insurgent movement” (Cunningham et al., codebook). The
second proxy for a group’s strength and control is Territorial Control, whether or not a
rebel group exercised control over territory in a given year. The ordinal variable Relative
Strength measures a group’s ability to militarily challenge the government. It ranges from
-2, for rebel groups that are much weaker than the government, to 2, for rebel groups that
are much stronger than the government. This variable also serves as a rough indicator for
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a combination of three organization-level variables included only in later models—arms
procurement, mobilizing capacity, and fighting capacity.
Control Variables. To account for pre-war economic conditions across the countries
represented in this analysis, I include the average GDP per capita between 1980 and 1988,
logged and in 2014 prices (Gleditsch 2002). Former Soviet republics were all missing
data, and I replaced these missing values with the aggregate Soviet Union GDP per
capita measure. The Relative Political Performance dataset provides us with proxies for
pre-war institutions and state bureaucracy; variable Political Institutions represents the
ability of a state to “appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals”
within developing societies (Kugler and Tammen 2012). Polity IV’s Executive Constraints
measures constraints on the chief executive from 1 (unlimited authority of the executive)
to 7 (executive parity or subordination), allowing us to control for political stability.
To control for conflict duration in the time-series cross-sectional dataset, I log the
years elapsed from when the group became active to the group-year observation. The
variable Intensity proxies the level of fighting, and is taken from PRIO’s Battle Deaths
Dataset, version 3.0. A score of 1 reflects between 25-999 yearly battle-related deaths,
and a score of 2 greater than 1,000.
Table 3.2: Missing Observations in Covariates: Cross-Sectional
Variable Missing Obs % Missing Obs Non-Missing Obs
Central Control 16 8.33 192
Territorial Control 2 0.96 206
Relative Strength 0 0.00 208
Mobilizing Capacity 9 4.33 199
Arms Procurement 11 5.29 197
Fighting Capacity 9 4.33 199
Logged GDP/cap 2 0.96 206
Executive Constraints 2 0.96 206
Logged Duration 0 0.00 208
Intensity 7 3.36 201
Logged Population 13 6.25 195
Note: One observation per group.
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Finally, many covariates were missing data, as shown in Table 3.2. I used simple
mean-based imputation on the control variables to increase the sample size, and include a
dummy to control for patterns of missingness. Summary statistics with units of analysis
are available for all variables in Table 3.1.
3.6 Analysis Strategy
Two forms of the combined Non-State Actor and Sexual Violence in Armed Con-
flict datasets are analyzed: the cross-sectional dataset that measures yearly perpetration
rates, and the TSCS dataset that reports whether or not a group was reported to have
committed sexual violence.
To compare the relative effects of the three measures of institutional strength—
strength of central control, territorial control, and relative rebel strength—I estimate a
series of OLS regressions that cluster standard errors by country for the cross-sectional
approach. After running the explanatory variables independently to compare their effects
in Columns (1) through (3), I run them together to see which has the highest independent
effects when controlling for the others in Column (4). To test the proposed relationship
between the concept of rebel institutional strength and sexual violence, in Column (5)
I create a normalized strength index from the first three variables. Table 4.1 shows the
results. The TSCS approach uses the same method in Table 4.2, clustering standard
errors by rebel group. I include a probit model, Table A.3, as a robustness check for the
second approach in the appendix. Table 4.3 uses the same controls to estimate the effects
of three other aspects of rebel strength—the relative capacities to mobilize, procure arms,
and fight—across groups and group-years using OLS regression.
Chapter 4
Results
Using a dataset that includes all rebel groups active in civil wars between 1989
and 2009, this analysis shows support for a statistically significant correlation between
various measures of a group’s strength and sexual violence. Notably, this correlation is
positive, meaning that stronger groups have higher propensities for sexual violence than
weaker groups do, in contrast to the suggestions of other studies. This finding is robust
across various measures of strength and with multiple controls.
4.1 Primary Results
I summarize results for the cross-rebel multivariate regression in Table 4.1. There is
evidence in support of a relationship between individual measures of institutional strength
and average sexual violence perpetration. Notably, when comparing the relative effects of
the three explanatory variables in Columns (1) through (3), all have positive coefficients,
suggesting that groups with higher levels of institutional strength perpetrate sexual vio-
lence more often over the duration of a conflict than weaker groupers. Individually, both
strength of central control and territorial control are significantly correlated with sexual
violence at the 0.10 level, but relative rebel strength does not achieve significance in this
26
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Table 4.1: Sexual Violence Propensity at Group Level: OLS Regression Results
Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Dependent Variable: Indicator for Sexual Violence
Strength Index 0.0506
(0.0202)**
Central Control 0.0344 0.0297
(0.0206)* (0.0217)
Territorial Control 0.0708 0.0339
(0.0420)* (0.0489)
Relative Strength 0.0566 0.0522
(0.0372) (0.0428)
Logged GDP/cap -0.0420 -0.0331 -0.0316 -0.0415 -0.0346
(0.0192)** (0.0163)** (0.0156)** (0.0180)** (0.0153)**
Political Institutions 0.116 0.0738 0.0882 0.106 0.0860
(0.0929) (0.0776) (0.0795) (0.0824) (0.0744)
Executive Constraints -0.00236 0.00243 0.00392 0.00447 0.00387
(0.0125) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0108)
Logged Duration 0.0139 0.0123 0.0225 0.0175 0.0176
(0.0143) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0161) (0.0142)
Intensity 0.0916 0.0797 0.0798 0.0620 0.0791
(0.0641) (0.0598) (0.0614) (0.0634) (0.0614)
Logged Population -0.0386 -0.0376 -0.0296 -0.0360 -0.0304
(0.0147)** (0.0135)*** (0.0120)** (0.0132)*** (0.0124)**
Missing -0.0182 -0.0248 -0.0472 -0.0289 -0.0394
(0.0269) (0.0249) (0.0302) (0.0239) (0.0262)
Constant 0.491 0.497 0.469 0.547 0.436
(0.293)* (0.251)* (0.241)* (0.272)** (0.230)*
Observations 191 205 207 190 207
R-squared 0.130 0.126 0.129 0.159 0.142
Table shows a positive association between SV and strength across groups
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country
Note: One observation per group
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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approach (p = .13). Column (1) suggests that for a one-point increase in strength of
central control (e.g. medium control to high control) the average rate of sexual violence
perpetration increased by 3.44 percent, or that a group with high levels of central control
would use sexual violence 10.32 percent more than a group without a central command
structure. In comparison, Column (2) suggests that when rebel groups control territory,
the average rate of sexual violence perpetration grew by 7.08 percent. Whereas strength
of the central command and the seven control variables explain 13 percent of variation
in sexual violence, territorial possession with the same controls accounts for 12.6 percent
of variation in sexual violence. Therefore, when these variables are evaluated indepen-
dently, a very strong central control increases the likelihood of sexual violence more than
controlling territory, and it also explains slightly more variation, but we are not able to
clearly distinguish between these effects.
When all three explanatory variables are included in Column (4), the model ex-
plains 15.9 percent of variation in mean sexual violence usage (F(10, 62) = 2.34, p =
.02). While controlling for the other two variables only slightly decreases the coefficients
on central control and relative strength, controlling for these two factors shrinks the co-
efficient on territorial control by half. Although the model cannot distinguish between
the three components of strength when they are controlling for each other, the model
itself is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. Correcting for this multicollinearity
problem, the index created in Column (5) shows that when strength of central control,
territorial control, and relative rebel strength are thought to represent components of the
same underlying concept, if a group’s “institutional strength” increases by one standard
deviation, the group is 5 percent more likely to perpetrate sexual violence. The index for
organizational strength along with the controls explains 14.2 percent of variation in sex-
ual violence. Factor analysis performed on the three explanatory variables also supported
the sign and magnitude of the index created. Figure 4.1 plots the residuals from Column
(5). The model violates the assumption of normality because the dependent variable was
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created as the average propensity over time, meaning the most common values for sexual
violence of 0 and 1. This is represented by the two downward sloping parallel lines we
can observe. I have delineated the two case studies that will follow with brown text and a
diamond marker. The ATTF is a weak rebel group for which the model predicts negative
sexual violence. The NPFL is the strongest rebel group where we predict positive sexual
violence. The coding of the NPFL will be addressed in the following section.
Figure 4.1: Residual Plot of Main Model
Besides the constant, the only other variables to achieve statistical significance in
all five models are the logged and lagged measures of GDP per capita and population.
In Column (5), both GDP per capita and population are negatively associated with sex-
ual violence at p < 0.05. Contrary to some theories, political institutions, executive
constraints, duration, and conflict intensity seem to have little influence on the average
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amount of sexual violence used by a rebel group. That conflict intensity does not signifi-
cantly predict the use of sexual violence in this model is notable, as it supports arguments
made by Wood and Cohen that wartime sexual violence is a distinct phenomenon that
cannot be explained solely through a correlation with battle deaths or with other forms
of one-sided violence.
Table 4.2 displays the results for the time-series cross-sectional approach. Columns
(1) through (3) show the independent effects of central strength, territory, and military
strength relative to the government. As with the previous approach, coefficients are
positive for all three of the explanatory variables. Column (1) predicts that as the central
control indicator increases by one point (e.g. from no central control to low central
control), rebel groups will be 1.5 percent more likely to use sexual violence in a given
year, though this result does not achieve statistical significance at the 0.10 level. Column
(2) predicts that groups that administer a swath of territory are 6.6 percent more likely
to employ sexual violence in a year, also failing to achieve statistical significance at the
0.10 level. In contrast, Column (3) predicts a statistically significant association between
relative rebel strength and sexual violence—as relative strength increases by one point on
the five-point indicator scale, the likelihood of sexual violence increases by 8.1 percent.
This estimation is significant at the p < 0.01 level and accounts for 15.6 percent of
variation in the yearly likelihood of sexual violence. To contextualize this estimation,
Column (3) predicts that groups that are slightly stronger militarily than the government
(Relative Strength = 1) are 24.3 percent more likely to engage in sexual abuse in a year
than rebel groups that are much weaker militarily than the government (Relative Strength
= -2).
Column (4) in Table 4.2 indicates that, controlling for the effects of strength of
central control and whether or not a group controlled territory, relative military strength
was still positively associated with the likelihood of sexual violence at the 0.05 level. The
model itself is again statistically significant, (F(9, 189) = 3.71, p = .0003), suggesting
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Table 4.2: Sexual Violence Propensity at Group-Year Level: OLS Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Dependent Variable: Indicator for Sexual Violence
Strength Index 0.0487
(0.0203)**
Central Control 0.0147 0.00902
(0.0303) (0.0301)
Territorial Control 0.0657 0.0401
(0.0489) (0.0540)
Relative Strength 0.0812 0.0720
(0.0275)*** (0.0294)**
Logged GDP/cap -0.0870 -0.0850 -0.0795 -0.0800 -0.0797
(0.0285)*** (0.0279)*** (0.0258)*** (0.0266)*** (0.0260)***
Political Institutions 0.0505 0.0374 0.0523 0.0525 0.0546
(0.0758) (0.0693) (0.0648) (0.0778) (0.0661)
Executive Constraints 0.0132 0.0146 0.0176 0.0166 0.0158
(0.0116) (0.0105) (0.0106)* (0.0107) (0.0106)
Intensity 0.115 0.101 0.0927 0.0925 0.0966
(0.0537)** (0.0499)** (0.0513)* (0.0501)* (0.0505)*
Logged Population -0.0625 -0.0610 -0.0527 -0.0538 -0.0537
(0.0156)*** (0.0147)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0139)***
Missing -0.0454 -0.0467 -0.0465 -0.0383 -0.0470
(0.0320) (0.0310) (0.0303) (0.0321) (0.0298)
Constant 1.125 1.119 1.119 1.095 1.013
(0.329)*** (0.320)*** (0.297)*** (0.305)*** (0.299)***
Observations 947 980 982 946 982
R-squared 0.144 0.147 0.156 0.167 0.155
Table shows a positive association between SV and strength across group-years
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by actor
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
that central control, territorial control, and relative strength help explain variation in
sexual violence, but are too closely related to be distinguished through this approach.
Using a normalized index to subsume the different measures of organizational strength in
Column (5), strength is positively associated with the likelihood of sexual violence, and
significant at the 0.05 level. As group strength increases by one standard deviation, the
group’s propensity for sexual violence in a given year rises by 4.9 percent. This model
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explains 15.5 percent of variation in sexual violence. Factor analysis was performed on
the three explanatory variables and supported the direction and magnitude of this index.
Logged and lagged controls of GDP per capita and population are negatively asso-
ciated with sexual violence, and statistically significant across Columns (1) through (5) at
the p < 0.01 level. Conflict intensity is also statistically significant in this approach, with
Column (5) estimating that if a conflict has more than 1,000 battle deaths the probability
that a group will commit sexual violence rises by 9.7 percent.
4.2 Secondary Results
Both Table 4.1 and 4.2 show a robust association between sexual violence and
organizational strength, generally defined. In addition, both suggest that richer and more
populous countries are less likely to observe this wartime phenomenon. However, we can
observe several differences between the two approaches. In the first, analyzing the mean
perpetration of sexual violence over the conflict duration shows that the independent
effects of relative military strength have less predictive power than territorial control
or central control. This relationship is reversed when focusing on yearly perpetration,
where relative military strength matters more than centrality or territory. In alternate
tests I ran, however, the independent effects of all three variables are significant in each.
Across the board, the yearly approach explains a higher proportion of the dependent
variable, suggesting that changes over time and across groups explain the dependent
variable more than a static cross-rebel understanding. Differences between the models
may signify that certain variables have more substantive meaning when averaged over the
conflict, or in accounting for change over time. For example, average conflict intensity
is not significantly correlated with the average propensity for sexual violence, but yearly
fighting levels are associated with yearly perpetration. This may indicate our inability to
measure fighting intensity accurately, or it could indicate that average conflict intensities
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matter less than yearly changes in explaining sexual violence. Finally, it is possible that
the relative effects of the explanatory variables were influenced by the missing data prior
to the mean-imputed increase in the sample size between Columns (4) and (5).
Table 4.3 includes regression results at the group and group-year level for the three
rough components of relative rebel strength: relative abilities to mobilize, procure arms,
and fight. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) support the associations of the prior two tables
between organizational strength and sexual violence. For both approaches, relative arms
procurement is positively associated with sexual violence at the minimum of the 0.05
level. Similarly, an increase in relative fighting capacity is associated with an increase
in sexual abuses—across groups it is significant at the 0.10 level, and over time it is
significant at the 0.01 level. Notably, relative mobilizing capacity, the ability of a rebel
group to mobilize popular support and personnel in comparison to the government, is
not statistically significant at the 0.10 level in either approach, and has a very small
coefficient. Although the results from the measures of relative arms procurement and
fighting capacity are consistent with the positive relationship observed above between
relative rebel strength and sexual violence, only mobilizing capacity does not uphold this
association.
Figure 4.2 plots the fitted values for the relationship between the strength index and
the average propensity for sexual violence used in the group-level approach. The figure
labels notable rebel groups and outlying points from the 208 rebel groups analyzed, and
it denotes the two cases in brown and with a diamond marker. A complete list of rebel
groups and their average propensity for sexual violence is available in the appendix. This
figure brings up the issue of data reliability from the various datasets merged in this
analysis, which is demonstrated through the coding of the NPFL. The UCDP/PRIO
dataset lists the NPFL as an active group for only two conflict years, 1989 and 1990,
marking the killing of President Samuel Doe by a rival faction on September 10, 1990
as the end of the conflict. In reality, the civil war continued at high levels until the
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Table 4.3: Propensity for Sexual Violence: OLS Regression Results
Unit: Groups (sv) Unit: Group-Years (sv2 )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Dependent Variable: Indicators for Sexual Violence
Mobilization Capacity 0.0042 0.0052
(0.035) (0.036)
Arms Procurement 0.12 0.15
(0.058)** (0.064)**
Fighting Capacity 0.11 0.13
(0.060)* (0.063)**
Logged GDP/cap -0.037 -0.033 -0.038 -0.092 -0.075 -0.084
(0.021)* (0.017)* (0.018)** (0.029)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)***
Pol. Institutions 0.095 0.10 0.11 0.046 0.064 0.046
(0.091) (0.080) (0.084) (0.072) (0.067) (0.066)
Exec. Constraints 0.00034 0.0050 0.0060 0.015 0.014 0.019
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)*
Logged Duration 0.018 0.027 0.030
(0.015) (0.015)* (0.015)*
Intensity 0.085 0.069 0.054 0.11 0.085 0.094
(0.062) (0.064) (0.070) (0.050)** (0.047)* (0.056)*
Logged Population -0.041 -0.033 -0.037 -0.066 -0.057 -0.060
(0.016)** (0.013)** (0.013)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)***
Missing -0.022 -0.034 -0.035 -0.048 -0.038 -0.039
(0.031) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
Constant 0.55 0.28 0.37 1.22 0.84 0.96
(0.30)* (0.23) (0.23) (0.33)*** (0.32)*** (0.30)***
Observations 198 196 198 965 949 965
R-squared 0.116 0.159 0.157 0.142 0.177 0.164
Table supports positive association between SV and strength at group and group-year levels
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country (1–3) and by actor (4–6)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1997 electoral victory of Charles Taylor, the head of the NPFL. The SVAC codes five
post-conflict years for each conflict, showing a presence of sexual violence in 1991, 1992,
1993, and 1995. There is no coded sexual violence in 1989, 1990, and 1994. Fighting
only occurred during the last week of 1989, but if we include it as a full observation, the
SVAC shows an average propensity for sexual violence of 0.57. The case study chapters
will explain this further, but based on evidence from other sources that suggests sexual
enslavement was present from the beginning of the fighting and clear reports of rape
in 1990 and 1994, the true mean propensity for sexual violence could be coded as 1,
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rather than 0. This example shows that there are reasons to look cautiously at this data
due to the UCDP/PRIO dataset’s initiation and termination criteria, used by both the
Non-State Actors dataset as well as the SVAC. However, the post-conflict information
provided by the SVAC still shows a score that reflects general trends in sexual violence
perpetration. Assuming that the data for most groups do not exclude the majority of
the conflict years, as happened in the case of the NPFL, this combination dataset can be
used to compare variation in relative sexual violence perpetration across rebel groups.
Figure 4.2: Fitted Value Plot
To summarize, an analysis of 208 rebel groups active between 1989 and 2009 shows
a robust, positive correlation between the relative strength of rebel organizations and
the sexual violence they perpetrate. I created a normalized index that combined the
concepts of central control, territorial control, and relative strength, which showed that
as a group’s strength increased by one standard deviation, the group has a 5 percent
higher propensity for sexual violence. These findings represent a significant insight into
the literature on sexual violence that contradicts prior assumptions about which groups
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are more likely to perpetrate sexual violence. This analysis raises questions about the
relative importance of the three primary measures of strength from Table 4.1 and Table
4.2, and if the ability to mobilize the civilian population is truly not related to sexual
violence. Although the positive relationship holds across rebel groups and over time, it
is impossible to demonstrate causal claims from this large-n analysis. Examining rebel
groups in depth will make the concepts of central control, territorial control, and relative
strength more clear in the context of this analysis. Case studies will also help us formulate




The previous chapter demonstrated, contrary to an assumption in the literature,
that stronger rebel groups are more likely to commit sexual violence during war than
weaker groups. This finding was consistent both across groups and across time, as well as
with several different measures of strength: central control, territorial control, strength
relative to the government, relative arms procurement capabilities, and relative fighting
capacities. Mobilizing capacity, defined as the ability of an organization to recruit person-
nel, was the only measure that did not show an association, either positive or negative,
with the dependent variables. This chapter proposes several mechanisms that could be
underlying this relationship, which I will then evaluate using two case studies.
5.1 Hierarchy: Masculine or Egalitarian?
If sexual violence is more commonly employed by stronger groups, this suggests
that observed sexual violence often occurs when it is tolerated or ordered, though it does
not preclude the possibility that even a strong group might be unable to restrain its
members. Two mechanisms that could be at play are that stronger, more hierarchical
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groups foster a culture of masculinity that does not constrain sexual violence, and that
sexual violence is used as a weapon of war.
The causal mechanism could be one of toleration, where stronger groups are more
likely to allow sexual violence to occur, but where there is no explicit order to commit
it. We assume that as rebel groups become stronger on this index they are more able to
constrain the actions of their combatants through incentives, discipline, and monitoring
capabilities. We also assume that stronger groups tend to be more hierarchical, with
organizational tiers delineated either on paper or in practice, and with the central lead-
ership checking the actions of middle-level commanders. This is partly a function of how
the strength index was created, as variable Central Control proxies hierarchy, but it also
reflects what scholars such as Weinstein (2007) argue, in that the growth of a rebel group
creates economies of scale that make a hierarchical form the most productive structure
(128–29). In this dataset, relatively stronger groups are typically larger in size,1 so it
is likely that they especially hold to the practice theorized by Weinstein of employing
“hierarchical structures rather than peer monitoring mechanisms to manage their organi-
zations” (134). Given these assumptions, a mechanism of toleration that could be at play
in this positive correlation between size and sexual violence is that stronger hierarchy fos-
ters a militaristic culture in which sexual violence “manifest[s] the militaristic masculine
identity of the male perpetrator” (Skjelsbæk 2001, 216). This essentialist approach im-
plies that “masculine” hierarchical organizations, as opposed to egalitarian or U-shaped
organizations, inherently encourage a militaristic culture that is rooted in camaraderie
and masculinity (Enloe 1993, 52). A culture of militaristic masculinity involves devaluing
the “feminine” attributes of empathy and gentleness and instead expressing emotions of
fear, desire, and anger during extreme situations, making sexual violence a means by
which to establish or reinforce masculinity (Seifert 1994, 59–62). Strong rebel groups
have the ability to discipline those who violate rules or norms, but sexual violence could
1Though they have greater numbers of troops, when this was held constant in Table A.2 the relation-
ship between strength and sexual violence was still significant.
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constitute a norm that is tolerated by leaders and encouraged among its members. There-
fore, this positive association between strength and sexual violence could be mediated by
militaristic cultures more common in hierarchical, strong groups that do not proscribe
practices that enhance the masculine identity of the perpetrator, but rather encourage
them. The case studies will address whether a confound is skewing this relationship, as
societal norms of egalitarianism or masculinity can influence the types of hierarchies that
emerge among rebel groups.
The positive relationship between strength and sexual violence interestingly does
not discount the “weapon of war” mechanism, where sexual violence is a strategy to
intimidate the civilian population into submission and deter collaboration with other
rebels or the government. Although explicit orders to commit rape are the exception
rather than the rule in times of war, the positive relationship from the quantitative
analysis could indicate that fighting capabilities moderate sexual violence when it is used
as an instrument of warfare. Stronger groups would be more likely than weak groups
to commit sexual violence at levels that would attract international attention and their
inclusion in this dataset.
5.2 Accountability to Constituency and Leadership
Another factor that could explain this relationship concerns the mediating effect
of dependency on civilians—as groups become more strong relative to the government
and control territory, they are less accountable to the civilian population and thus may
not proscribe the use of sexual violence. Stronger rebel organizations, including those
with the ability to procure arms from external sources (variable Arms Procurement)
and with greater fighting capacities (variables Fighting Capacity and Rebel Strength),
rely less on the sympathy of the civilian population for recruitment and social capital
(Weinstein 2007, 48–49), as groups can pay their combatants or more readily forcibly
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recruit them. Without an incentive to endear themselves to the local population to
acquire food or recruits, leaders and commanders do not concern themselves with the
treatment of civilians in the territory under their control, and also allow their combatants
to use coercive tactics when extracting resources from the population.
Furthermore, this positive association could be picking up on the tendency of
stronger groups with territorial control to garrison troops far from their homelands and
families, with distance from communities moderating the relationship between strength
and sexual violence. Without ties to the civilian population or familial constraints, com-
batants are more likely to rape or rely on sexual slavery. In addition, strong groups
advance more readily beyond their bases, creating frontlines with high incidence rates of
all types of violence against civilians, and into territories with populations unsympathetic
toward their cause. They then target men and women who refuse cooperation or who
they believe to be supporting alternate rebel groups or the government. Groups establish
checkpoints and prisons to regulate the population once they have gained control of these
territories, and in these locations combatants wield asymmetric power over civilians that
increases the opportunity for preying on women. Weaker groups, on the other hand, lack
the capacity to expand territorially beyond their bases of support, and would still be
operating within government-controlled territory, which would constrain violence against
civilians. However, the data do not show a relationship between mobilizing capacity
(Mobilization Capacity) and sexual violence that would support this mechanism, as the
ability to attract personnel could function as a proxy for operating outside of a group’s
homeland. Forced recruitment as measured by Cohen (2013a) provides an alternative
proxy for acting outside of a group’s base of support, and she finds that abduction is
positively associated with rape. The following case studies will examine the relationship
between proximity to a sympathetic constituency and sexual violence to work out the
role of social capital in the repertoire of violence used by groups.
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5.3 Reporting Bias or Mechanical Relationships
The positive association between strength and sexual violence found in the previous
chapter could reflect two biases: a bias in the reporting of sexual violence or a mechanical
bias in the creation of the dependent variable.
The reporting bias could reflect that international organizations pay more attention
to relatively stronger rebel groups and disproportionately code them as committing sexual
violence. They could also view groups with lower degrees of internal institutions, all else
equal, as less threatening to state sovereignty and international security. Furthermore,
the dependent variables sv and sv2 from the SVAC dataset could reflect a mechanical
association between larger group size—and thus rebel strength—and the perpetration of
sexual violence, where larger groups are more likely to perpetrate even one violation.
We cannot prove that this is not influencing the coding of the dependent variable, but
Table A.2 suggests that the relationship between strength and sexual violence exists even
when controlling for troop size, and reports from the three sources used in the SVAC
detail patterns of violence rather than isolated incidents of insubordination that might
be statistically expected among any group of men and women.2
5.4 Case Motivations and Selection
The quantitative analysis established that there is some positive relationship be-
tween sexual violence and a notion of organizational strength that holds across groups
and over time, but the analysis was unable to demonstrate causality. In addition, the
variables that measured strength of central control, territorial control, and rebel strength
2It is useful to keep in mind that out of the 208 rebel groups, 172 (or 83 percent) were never coded as
using sexual violence. Given the prevalence of rape even in times of peace where there are strong societal
and legal constraints discouraging sexual violence, it seems probable that the dependent variable is not
picking up isolated acts that might have occurred within any rebel organization over the average 5 year
duration of these conflicts.
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presented a multicollinearity problem that suggest, according to the theory proposed,
that they represent components of some underlying feature of rebel groups. The follow-
ing two chapters will address through cases the questions of what the causal direction
is between strength and reports of sexual violence; which components of organizational
strength matter the most in the toleration, support, or prohibition of wartime sexual
violence; which of the mechanisms outlined in the previous chapter account for the inclu-
sion or absence of sexual violence in a group’s violent repertoire; and if some confound
is influencing both strength and sexual violence. Additionally, the following qualitative
analysis will probe the concept of mobilizing capacity and evaluate the suggestion from
Table 4.3 that it is not associated either positively or negatively with sexual violence, in
contrast with the other variables thought to represent rebel strength.
The selection of cases was undertaken keeping in mind the reporting problem de-
tailed previously. We cannot know whether or not stronger groups received dispropor-
tionate attention from the sources used to code the SVAC, or if this caused them to have
higher sv scores. What causes wartime sexual violence is not yet well understood, and it
is underreported to varying degrees across conflicts (Wood 2010, 302). Nonetheless, the
data used previously show a range in perpetration even across well-documented cases and
in conflicts with vigilant human rights monitors (Wood 2010, 302). We should not dismiss
ex ante, then, that the data in less newsworthy cases are unreliable, especially over long
periods of time where other violence is documented. Rather, we should be cautious of de-
veloping and testing theories exclusively on the cases of the Revolutionary United Front,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rwanda. Though these were significant atrocities, they have
been sensationalized by the media and scholars, have already been scrutinized through
the lens of sexual violence, and may not be generalizable.
With these considerations in mind, I strategically include an understudied group
as well as a group more notorious for its violence, though still outside the common three
cases. In addition, due to the surprising suggestion that stronger rebel groups use sexual
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violence more often than weaker groups, I selected from the ends of the spectrum that
support this association: weaker groups without reports of sexual violence and stronger
groups with more reports. This selection is best suited for probing the observed relation-
ship and testing for spuriousness.
Using the index created through the factor analysis in Chapter 3 to represent
strength, I selected the All Tripura Tiger Force (also, All Tripura Tribal Front) of India as
an example of a weak group coded without sexual violence. With the lowest scores pos-
sible for the variables of interest from the Non-State Actors dataset, the ATTF is among
six other groups with the minimum conceptual index score for rebel strength. The group
became active in 1990, reached the threshold of 25 battle deaths per year in 1992, fought
below the threshold from 1994 and 1996, and at higher levels again between 1997 and
1999. Five post-conflict years are coded in the SVAC, so the dataset has documentation
for the group over 13 years, showing an absence of sexual violence over a significant pe-
riod of time. By using a long-standing “weak” group that has good documentation of its
actions and institutional characteristics, I hope to avoid the possible pitfall of selecting
a case that under-reports sexual violence because of its obscurity, though this will still
be a consideration. In addition, there are numerous reports of the one-sided violence
committed by the ATTF against civilians in Tripura, yet not clear evidence for sexual
violence. Close analysis of the case will investigate the factors that led to mass killings
of Bengalis, whom the ATTF hoped to expel from Tripura, but not the use rape or other
forms of sexual violence against them.
The National Patriotic Front of Liberia has the highest coding for variables related
to rebel strength in the dataset, and is one of only two organizations among the 208 ever
coded as “much stronger” than the government.3 In recent versions of the UCDP/PRIO
dataset it is only coded as a member of an active conflict dyad in 1989 and 1990, yet
fighting continued through the middle of the decade as the NPFL disarmed and entered
3The only other group with a coding of rebstrength=2 was the National Salvation Front of Romania
which gained control of the Romanian government with the army’s support in the revolution of 1989.
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into the political process. The unusual coding of the conflict’s end date was addressed
in the previous chapter, and the NPFL’s well-documented usages of sexual violence are
representative of the phenomenon we are trying to explain. In addition, though this
Liberian conflict was linked to the Sierra Leone case, as Charles Taylor was convicted
for providing material and strategic support to the RUF, it breaks from the strict focus
on the RUF and can yield insights into the contagion of sexual violence between the two
countries.
Table 5.1 summarizes the five hypothesized interactions between the strength of a
rebel group and its sexual violence. The coming chapter will evaluate the mechanisms
using a pair of case studies.
Table 5.1: Possible Mechanisms Underlying Correlation between Strength and SV
Mechanism Relationship Notable Variables Description
hierarchy mediating central control strength(M1, hierarchy), → mascu-
line culture → toleration of SV
weapon of war moderating fighting capacity strategic decision to rape→ moder-
ated by fighting capabilities → SV
accountability
mediating mobilizing capacity (i) strength → less reliant on social
capital → toleration of SV
moderating territorial control (ii) strength→ troops garrisoned→
fewer constraints against SV
reporting spurious relative strength strength → attention → SV reports
Chapter 6
Case I: The All Tripura Tiger Force
Tripura is a small state in India’s northeast that has experienced rapid societal
changes and persistent insurgency. Formed in 1990, the All Tripura Tiger Force sought
to force out Bengali-speaking immigrants, restore tribal lands, and increase Tripura’s
autonomy, yet notably did not commit sexual violence in its camapgin of ethnic cleansing.
I argue that in this case cultural norms confound the relationship between strength and
sexual violence, and I find mixed support for the other mechanisms.
6.1 Background
Essential to an understanding of the dynamics and political motivations of this con-
flict is the rapid demographic change and land alienation of tribal peoples that occurred
in Tripura during the 20th century. Tripura, along with the other states of northeast
India, has historically represented a mix of ethnicities and cultures, with 19 indigenous
tribes comprising its native population. Despite the migrations of the pre-colonial and
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colonial era, in the early 20th century these Tripuri tribes of Bodo ancestry still com-
prised a majority population (Mukherjee 2005, 12). Several events triggered the demo-
graphic upheaval that would provide the foundation for the All Tripura Tribal Front’s
insurgency, the most important of which were the 1947 partition of India and the 1971
Figure 6.1: Map of India: Box Designates Se-
lection Below
secession war of East Pakistan, now
Bangladesh. Violence resulting from the
partition and secession led to the migra-
tion of over 600,000 Bengali refugees into
this small state (Adam et al. 2007, 967).
From holding an ethnic majority at the be-
ginning of the century, tribal populations
dropped to 28 percent in 1971 and set-
tled at approximately 31 by the time that
this insurgency began (Mukherjee 2005,
53; Adam et al. 2007, 966–967). Most of
the rest of the population was comprised of
the Bengali Hindu population, who were
increasingly gaining land rights to tribal
lands and some of whose families had been
established in the state for several generations by the time the ATTF proclaimed its
anti-Bengali sentiments. In addition, Tripura is the smallest state in India’s northeast
and—though 84 percent of the population lives in rural areas—is the most densely pop-
ulated, with approximately 3.1 million residents (Bhaumik 2009, 294; Administrative
Reforms Commission 2009, 265; Minorities at Risk 2006). This unfavorable man-to-land
ratio exacerbated land disputes and tribal land alienation. In sum, the rapid migrations
that had been triggered by British policy, the partition, and the independence of East
Pakistan engendered a demographic reversal that all historical accounts link to the in-
surgencies ubiquitous in the state in the late 20th century. In analyzing the violence
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employed against civilians in the region we should keep in mind the ethnic and cultural
heterogeneity of the state’s population in general and even among the Tripura tribes.
Figure 6.2: Tripura (Yellow) in India’s Northeast
The isolation of the region in combination with demographic change created con-
ditions that made insurgency viable and unconventional warfare tactics the favorable
strategy of the ATTF. Approximately 60 percent of Tripura is covered by forests, and
the hilly terrain has provided sanctuary to the different indigenous tribes fleeing state-
making projects even during the times of the princely Tripura (ARC 2009, 265; Sengupta
2014, 319). Geographic isolation within the state contributed to the high number of
heterogeneous tribes that comprise the native population, and we see the lack of cooper-
ation among modern insurgent organizations reflecting the vastly different customs and
fractionalized identities among the Tripuri people. The state of Tripura is also isolated
from other states of the already-distant northeast, as it is almost entirely surrounded
by Bangladesh, sharing only a 50 kilometer border and one highway with the rest of
India (ARC 2009, 265). Travel between Kolkata and Tripura takes 12 hours through
Bangladesh but 48 hours through the Siliguri Corridor, making it difficult for the Indian
state apparatus to govern and monitor the state (ARC 2009, 265). In this sense, the
ATTF was less constrained by the threat of criminal prosecution than it would have been
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in a region more accessible to the administrative center of India, and also more difficult
for the Indian military to reach to put down the insurgency.
Perhaps made more feasible by the state’s forest cover and hills, relative inaccessi-
bility to the rest of India, and isolation between communities within the state, modern
insurgency in Tripura can be traced back to 1949, when insurgents protested the merger
of the princely state and the Indian Union. Secessionist and ethnically-driven insurgency
became increasingly common and bloody in the 1980s, with the ATTF joining a long list
of armed groups that directed violence against the state and segments of its population.
In addition, these groups held varying aims and so they often directed violence against
one another (Chakravarti 2001, 2229). The Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) had been
the primary tribal opposition organization of the 1980s, and in 1990 the All Tripura Tribal
Front emerged as an offshoot amidst this climate of insurgency. The group changed its
name in 1992 to the All Tripura Tiger Force and established a constitution that detailed
its goals, a code of conduct, and a rough command chain (South Asia Terrorism Portal).
Negotiations with the government and the disarmament of 1,600 combatants led to a
respite in battle-related deaths between 1994 and 1996. From 1997 to 1999 the conflict
resumed at war levels, dipping below the threshold in 2000 and fading out over the first
decade of the century. Over the course of the conflict the group claimed an average
of about 800 combatants, and it was allegedly linked to tribal political organizations,
including the Tripura Peoples’ Democratic Front (South Asia Terrorism Portal).
Though the ATTF and the militant-Christian NLFT were the two largest and most
active tribal insurgent groups operating at this time, the ATTF was substantially smaller
and weaker than India’s state security forces. The group averaged about 800 troops over
the duration of its activity, with a maximum of over 1,600 members. In contrast, the
Indian military totalled about 1.27 million in the early 1990s, when the ATTF became
active, and over 2.25 million during the second phase of the conflict (World Bank). A
more accurate picture of the relative strength of the actors emerges from reports on the
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troops deployed to the region—in early 1993 the Indian government ordered that 12,000
additional paramilitary forces be sent to Tripura to combat election-related violence, and
in 1997 the government sent 2,400 forces explicitly to contain the various armed insurgent
groups (Minorities at Risk 2010).
The following analysis will consider the ATTF’s repertoire of violence, the rela-
tionship between the absence of sexual violence and the group’s strength and control,
and how mobilizing capacity and relationships with the civilian population influenced the
repertoire of violence. To do so, I will evaluate each of the hypotheses proposed in Table
5.1 and discuss which factors explain the absence of sexual violence in a campaign of
ethnic cleansing.
6.2 Hierarchy
In Table 5.1 I posit that one variable influencing the relationship between strength
and sexual violence is the hierarchy of a group. A rebel group’s strength is made up in part
by hierarchy, and it is possible that U-form organizational structures create a culture of
militarism that encourages sexual violence, as described in the previous chapter (Johnston
2008, 116). In contrast, M-form organizations may lack this culture of militarism or even
promote norms that discourage the use of sexual violence among the rank and file. The
case of the ATTF is complicated both by its seemingly-hierarchical structure as laid out
in its constitution as well as by egalitarian Tripuri cultural norms that may confound the
relationship between hierarchy and sexual violence. I argue that this mechanism shows
the cultural norms that made sexual violence relatively more rare and well-prosecuted
during peacetime, but that these tribal values likely influenced both the organization of
the group as well as the absence of sexual violence.
The Non-State Actor Dataset codes the ATTF as having the lowest possible score
for central control during its two conflict phases. This score entails that the group was
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considered to be highly factionalized and to have such low levels of leadership that the
named leaders would have been unable to exert much control over the daily lives of its
troops, or to have effectively coordinated and managed operations (Cunningham et al.
2013, 522). Two former members of the TNV insurgent group, Lalit Debbarma and
Ranjit Debbarma, unhappy with the settlement and disarmament the group had agreed
upon with the state, led the ATTF at its inception. The constitution available on the
South Asia Terrorism Portal1 indicates that the group had at least been conceptualized
with a structure in mind, with a president and vice-president as well as secretaries of
organization, publicity, communications, and finance forming the top committee (South
Asia Terrorism Portal). The president was authorized to hold ultimate authority over
troops and was vested with the power of taking extreme actions in times of emergency
(Art. 5; Art. 12). A leadership line of succession was delineated that would place
the vice-president and then the “Secretary General/Commander-in-chief” in charge in
the president’s absence (Art. 12). In addition to the chain of command, there was
also a detailed military structure outlined by the constitution as shown in Figure 6.3,
with a specific ratio of units to zones to companies to battalions. Unfortunately, with
the hastiness of the constitution’s translation the number of battalions per regiment is
unclear, as is the chain of command between the top committee and the two regiments,
but the drafting of the document revealed a familiarity with the structure of the Indian
military, with details such as the insignia assigned to relative ranks. On paper, therefore,
the ATTF appeared to feature a typical U-form organizational structure that would have
enabled unified military decision-making and increased coordination of the group. A U-
form structure also could have aided in the development of a militaristic culture that
would have encouraged actions that enhanced the masculine wartime identities of group
members, such as rape or gang rape (Seifert 1994).
1The constitution available in the appendix, taken from the SATP, is hastily translated but thorough.
It is undated but because it lists Ranjit Debbarma as the president, it was likely written following the
first “disarmament” in 1993–94.
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Figure 6.3: Official Military Command as Delineated by ATTF Constitution
Note: It is not clear that this hierarchy was ever realized. Rather, evidence suggests
that egalitarian norms prevailed, organizing capacity was low, and leaders personally
led attacks. Figure created using information from the SATP.
In spite of the administrative and military hierarchies delineated in the constitution,
it is unclear the extent to which this structure was put into effect after it was written down,
if at all. The hierarchy outlined in the constitution would have had the potential to give
the leaders a great deal of control over the day-to-day lives of combatants if implemented
in combination with methods for the principals to monitor the agents, and under ideal
conditions. We should take into account, however, the rough terrain and the location of
bases both in Tripura and across the border of Bangladesh (South Asia Terrorism Portal).
Due to distance, a lack of a steady revenue stream, and the group’s need to retain the small
membership it could claim, district commanding officers as well as their subordinates may
not have been subject to strict surveillance from the executive committee, and leaders may
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have lacked the capacity to discipline their members according to the group’s regulations.
Reports refer to various central committee members by name, so it is likely that at a
minimum the top levels of the hierarchy were realized. However, with the group’s size
sometimes fluctuating to as low as 200, and accounts that purport the president and
vice-president were personally present during raids, it is probable that not every level of
the hierarchical command materialized (Minorities at Risk 2010). Therefore, attempts at
creating the hierarchy detailed above may have failed for logistical reasons.
However, there is evidence from the constitution that in addition to practical con-
straints, the U-form hierarchy was also undermined by cultural norms that promoted
egalitarianism. I argue that although the constitution outlines a strict hierarchy that
could lead to a culture that promotes wartime masculinity, the group could be better
classified as egalitarian, and that the tribal emphasis on equality may have undermined
the delineated hierarchy. The code of conduct and the organization’s goals illustrate the
great influence that tribal identity held for the leadership, and it is fair to assume that the
various Tripuri tribes’ conceptions of governance and equality also would have impacted
notions of organization. For example, certain cultural practices and prohibitions are re-
flected in the constitution, such as a ban on all alcohol except during marriages and social
functions, and a ban on marijuana and other drugs (Art. 2). Protecting tribal culture
was one of the main mandates of the group and complementary to the goal of expelling
non-tribals and their “distorted culture,” and is outlined specifically in the constitution
(Art. 2). Though there exists a heterogeneity of practices and social relations among
the tribal groups, Tripuri egalitarianism is rooted in their agrarian society that generally
does not feature sharp class divisions and that does not feature Western notions of pri-
vate property (Bhaumik 2009, 296, 299). Village councils allocate jhum fields to families
and organize cooperative labor for hunting, fishing, and gathering, though some tribes
have chiefs in addition to village councils (Sen 1993, 34). Men and women sit on village
councils, and must be elected unanimously by all adults in the village (Jena 2009, 54).
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We can see this undermining of vertical forms of organization in favor of the collective,
and concern for rights and equality, reflected in the constitution. Article 4 states that
in their fight against oppression all members of the ATTF possess constitutional rights,
and members were to pay their dues in proportion to their familial incomes. Article
4 adds that all combatants have the right to “disclose their respective opinion to their
superiors and also have the right to give and take advice” (ii). We can also see this in
the group’s stated concern for its relationship with and treatment of the (tribal) popu-
lation of Tripura. All combatants were charged with behaving politely toward “common
innocent people,” prohibited from attacking any religious building or hospital, and those
who broke the drinking ban were not allowed to take part in operations afterwards (Art.
4; Art. 6; Art. 5). This formalized consideration of human rights likely did not extend
to Bengali-speaking people.
Tribal culture also seems to have influenced the role and view of women in the
ATTF. Though most Tripuri tribes are patrilineal, their role in jhum cultivation rendered
women the “economic backbone” in their communities (Ghosh and Choudhuri 2011, 74;
Sen 1993, 71). The socioeconomic importance of women in these communities gives
them a high status within society, allowing them to be selective in choosing husbands,
to withhold consent from marriages, and to divorce (Ghosh and Choudhuri 2011, 75;
Sen 1993, 37, 53, 55). In addition, tribal communities historically prosecuted violence
against women with severe punishments; an 1886 criminal law allowed the death penalty
to be used in certain cases of violence against women (Ghosh and Choudhuri 2011, 75).
The constitution also explicitly refers to women several times. In the article concerning
discipline, it states that “no torture will be made upon any women of the community” and
that pregnant women should not be killed (Art. 6, ii and iii). This first mention, though
vague in translation, seems to explicitly prohibit its members from committing sexual
violence. In addition, the article concerning group structure notes the role that elected
Tripuri women could play in communication and intelligence gathering, alluding to the
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village committees of the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC)
and the quota that reserved one third of the elected positions for women (Art. 12,
vi). In 2006 elections, for example, there were 4,165 elected members on the TTAADC
committees of Tripura, so about 1,390 would have been women (ARC 2009, 268). In
addition to the role of women in intelligence, police reports detailing the surrender of
ATTF militants reveal that the group recruited women to serve as combatants (South
Asia Terrorism Portal).
In sum, female insurgents fought for and served other key roles within the ATTF,
and the group’s constitution prohibited gender-based violence. However, official prohibi-
tions against killing politicians or for revenge also existed, and there is ample evidence
that both occurred in a campaign of ethnic cleansing that targeted government leaders
and Bengalis who had settled on traditional tribal lands. We should not assume that
because there existed a written prohibition against gender-based violence that this would
necessarily limit combatants’ perpetration. Few, if any, rebel groups create written doc-
uments that have the potential to become public authorizing rape. In fact, the document
and other statements imply that civilian protections only pertained to the original “man
of the soil,” suggesting that non-native civilians were not considered to be “common in-
nocent people” and that there would not have been as strict of regulations against or
punishments for these civilian abuses (Art. 11; Art. 4; Chakravarti 2001, 2230). In this
sense, the absence of reported sexual violence against Bengalis is significant.
The constitution reveals, therefore, that its drafter was familiar with military hier-
archies, but cannot prove that the central hierarchy imagined in Article 12 was put into
practice. The group’s low membership may have facilitated greater monitoring capacities
over the day-to-day operations of combatants, but this effect would have been mitigated
by rough geography, the cross-border location of bases and the top command, and the
tendency towards using small hit-and-run attacks (Minorities at Risk 2010). In addition,
though the group displayed an outward concern for the civilian population of Tripura, we
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cannot prove who the ATTF considered to be legitimate civilians. We also cannot prove
that the document had any effect on the conduct of its combatants beyond the suggestion
that ATTF leaders may have encouraged a culture of restraint. Nonetheless, indiscrim-
inate attacks on non-tribals suggest that the group did not consider the population of
Bengali immigrants and refugees to be among those afforded basic rights. If, then, the
ATTF wanted to force out the Bengali and they used terror tactics to do so, a key puzzle
is why sexual violence did not figure into their repertoire. One possible explanation is
rooted in the egalitarian tribal cultures noted above, whose norms may have influenced
both the expression of hierarchy and of violence against women, rather than in the causal
direction described in the first mechanism. Tribal norms then serve as a confound on
the relationship measured in the quantitative analysis, influencing both organizational
strength as well as sexual violence perpetration.
6.3 Weapon of War
The second mechanism notes that when sexual violence is used as a weapon of
war, strong organizational and fighting capacities may amplify its prevalence. There is
scant evidence for the existence of sexual violence at all among the ATTF, and rather
the suggestion from the constitution that rape and other mistreatment of women was
prohibited (Art. 6). The group did engage in ethnic cleansing against the Bengali-
speaking immigrant population of Tripura, and such ethnic cleansing often brings with it
accounts of systematic sexual violence, as in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Skjelsbæk
2001, 211).
To understand the other systematic abuses against civilians committed, sources
note that the ATTF directed the bulk of its violence at non-indigenous Bengali civilians
living in rural areas (Saha 2002, 58). Reports of the ATTF insurgents setting villages
ablaze and firing upon civilians en masse represent the most common types of violence
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against civilians employed (Banerjee 1997; Saha 2002, 59; Sajjadali 1997). Accounts
typically read like this description from February 1998: “Five members of two non-tribal
families, including women and children, were gunned down by militants of the All Tripura
Tiger Force at Padmabil, a hill village in West Tripura. Two persons were seriously
injured in the attack. The militants torched several houses in the area before escaping”
(Minorities at Risk 2010). This project of ethnic cleansing did not differentiate based on
gender, neither refraining from violence against women altogether nor targeting women
for sexual violence while killing men, as is common in conflicts (Cohen 2013a, 462). In
addition to its attacks on tribal noncombatants, the ATTF also targeted rival insurgents,
police and paramilitary forces, and—on at least one occasion—health workers providing
polio vaccines to children (Minorities at Risk 2010). Although it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish between the activities perpetrated by rival insurgent factions in Tripura, some
estimate that the insurgencies of the 1990s resulted in about 3,000 deaths, with civilians
comprising 78 percent of the fatalities (Adam et al. 2007, 966).
There is limited evidence for rape or other forms of sexual violence by the All
Tripura Tiger Force among many sources that detail other abuses of the population
(Ghosh 2003). A possible exception comes from late 1998 when the group, in accordance
with its goal of preserving cultural traditions and stamping out non-tribal influences,
threatened to kill any woman not wearing traditional tribal garb in the workplace (Mi-
norities at Risk 2010). Aside from this case, the previous section on hierarchy suggests
that tribal influences predominantly increased constraints on violence against women for
the ATTF. On the other hand, there is evidence from the Human Rights Watch and
other organizations that state security forces deployed from elsewhere raped women and
committed other abuses against civilians, having been given broad powers to combat the
insurgency (HRW 2008; Chakma 2007). It is unclear if this occurred during the conflict
years coded in the dataset or exclusively in the years immediately preceding the reports,
though.
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In a weapon of war framework, the ATTF’s low fighting capacity alone does not
explain the absence of sexual violence amidst massacres used instrumentally against Ben-
galis. Sophisticated and large numbers of weapons may facilitate insurgencies and im-
prove a rebel group’s chances against the government, but they are not necessary for
sexual violence to occur on a wide scale. We observe reports of extensive sexual abuses
committed by Hutus who were unarmed, or armed with clubs, machetes, or sticks, in the
Rwandan genocide, as well as sexual violence by unarmed men and women in wealthy
peacetime democracies (Verwimp 2006, 13; HRW 1996). The weapon of war mechanism
proposed in the previous chapter thus does not clearly link the group’s relative weakness
to the absence of sexual violence. Rather, massacres of Bengalis in the absence of sexual
violence challenges the utility of a weapon of war framework in differentiating between
forms of violence.
6.4 Accountability
The first accountability mechanism posits that weaker rebel groups are more reliant
on civilians for membership and funding their organizations, and the second that weaker
groups are less likely to operate outside of traditional zones of support or with impunity,
fighting within areas controlled by the government.
The ATTF’s relationship with the civilian population was influenced by the demo-
graphic and geographic realities of the state that influenced their ability to mobilize the
population and procure arms. Geography worked to the group’s favor, as hills and forests
allowed for guerrilla warfare and other non-conventional tactics and provided natural
havens for the group within the state. In addition, with Bangladesh bordering Tripura
on three sides, the rebels established headquarters, training camps, bases, safe homes,
and a communication center across the border in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (South Asia
Terrorism Portal). Because of their ability to retreat from government counterinsurgency
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measures into Bangladesh or the hills of Tripura, combatants were less reliant upon the
civilian population for quartering, although the group did forcibly tax some communities
to fund its insurgency (Minorities at Risk 2010). ATTF insurgents did not have a high
ability to procure arms due to their geographic isolation, small size, and relative obscurity
outside of the region, and compensated for this by raiding police stations when neces-
sary for arms and ammunition (Minorities at Risk 2010; South Asia Terrorism Portal).
At times the ATTF allied itself with other armed groups operating in India’s northeast,
such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang, United Liberation Front
of Asom, and the People’s Liberation Army (South Asia Terrorism Portal). They may
also have been able to appeal to a transnational constituency to aid their cause, as the
partition had left some tribal Tripuri people living in Bangladesh.
About 70 percent of the ATTF came from the Debbarma clan of the Tripuri tribe,
the largest indigenous group within the state (South Asia Terrorism Portal; Sen 1993,
48). Still, the ATTF’s goals were inherently antagonistic toward recent Bengali-speaking
migrants and refugees, leaving them with the possible voluntary support of only 30 percent
of the small state’s population. Even though the rebels initially found support among
disaffected youth, the proliferation of vying insurgent groups in the 1990s spread the
loyalty of the tribal population among many groups, causing them to fear retaliation
from rival groups should they cooperate with one and not another (Minorities at Risk
2010). The ATTF threatened even indigenous Tripuri people if they paid “insurgency
taxes” to other groups, especially their rival, the NLFT, but it is not clear to what
degree they relied on looting or these taxes to finance their operations, as the ATTF
gained additional revenues from kidnapping ransoms (Chakravarti 2001, 2231; Minorities
at Risk 2010).
It is difficult to define the relationship between the ATTF and civilians, both due
to lack of information about how the ATTF financed its operations as well as the compet-
itive Tripuri landscape that featured a homogeneity of insurgent groups and ethnicities.
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Regarding the first mechanism, the ATTF was reliant on tribals in sense that they claimed
to represent indigenous interests, but they lacked accountability to the Bengali popula-
tion that they explicitly targeted. The extent to which the ATTF relied on civilians for
food and financing is unclear, but they targeted police stations for weapons, kidnapped
for ransom, and received money from the government after inflating the numbers of com-
batants who had disarmed (Minorities at Risk 2010; Banerjee 1997). This mechanism
holds little explanatory power for the relationship between the group’s weakness relative
to India and the absence of sexual violence, nor would it be able to explain why other
forms of civilian abuse occurred while sexual violence did not.
The second mechanism does not seem to explain patterns of violence for the ATTF,
though the case does nuance the relationship posited in the previous chapter. The ATTF
held transnational bases from which it launched attacks and was effectively garrisoned in
Bangladesh, but I find no evidence that the group committed sexual violence across the
border where it may have been less accountable to the population, nor in Tripura where
combatants would have been far from the leadership. This case suggests that distance
from home bases of support is not enough to explain the observance of sexual violence,
but that strength may affect its observance.
6.5 Reporting Bias
Based on newspaper articles, reports from NGOs on human rights, and the sec-
ondary literature, I argue that it is most likely that the ATTF did not exhibit a pattern
of sexual violence during these stages of the conflict. For a group substantially weaker
and less well trained than the armed forces of India, operating in a context with numerous
other small insurgent groups, there are still a number of reports that detail the organi-
zation’s violence against civilians. We cannot definitively rule out reporting biases here
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or among all weaker groups, but neither the coding mechanics nor the group’s obscurity
outside of the region seem to be confounding patterns of sexual violence.
6.6 Analysis
Despite committing substantial ethnically-motivated violence against the Bengali
settler population in addition to their targeting of police and security forces, there are no
reports of the ATTF committing sexual violence against civilians. Although proving what
influenced the absence of a phenomenon is inherently tricky, the absence of sexual violence
should be viewed in the context of these other violations so that the question becomes
what distinguishes sexual violence from other forms of violence. The mechanisms that
involve the group’s fighting capacity and accountability to the constituency do not explain
variations in the repertoire of violence, nor does the reporting bias beyond the suggestion
that sexual violence may go underreported because of its often private nature. The
mechanism relating to the structure of the group indirectly points toward an interesting
confound in this case: egalitarian tribal norms. The ATTF launched the insurgency to
protect its traditional culture from the Bengalis and to regain an agricultural livelihood
that had been eroded by accelerated land alienation. It is unsurprising that wartime
behaviors reflected peacetime values, or that in an egalitarian system that valued the
contributions of women and provided for the protection against sexual violence that
sexual violence was rare. I argue that these norms limited the realization of the hierarchy
delineated by the constitution and also can be tied to the absence of sexual violence in
this conflict.
Chapter 7
Case II: The National Patriotic
Front of Liberia
Q. Now help us, Mr. Taylor. During the course of the NPFL’s campaign in Liberia,
were atrocities committed?
A. I will be the first to admit that bad things did happen in Liberia during the
operations of the NPFL, for several reasons . . . Yes, there were times when some
individuals, because of their own selfish motives, engaged in certain actions, but
what is very clear is that when we found out that atrocities had been committed, we
acted. . . .
Q. Were you thereafter aware of atrocities being committed in Sierra Leone? . . .
A. Well, we heard that people were getting killed, women were getting raped and dif-
ferent things, and we couldn’t understand it. I could not understand it, because these
are things that we did not tolerate in Liberia and so for me it was unacceptable.1
The National Patriotic front of Liberia began its offensive against the Samuel Doe gov-
ernment in 1989, quickly taking over a vast majority of the country in its march toward
Monrovia. With foreign support and an abundance of resources at its disposal, Charles
Taylor’s NPFL represents a strong rebel group that engaged in significant sexual violence
over the duration of the conflict. I will argue that the group’s strength led to situations
that weakened combatants’ accountability to civilians and the leadership, which in turn
increased the opportunity for sexual violence.
1“Tuesday 14 July 2009.” 2009. The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, case no. SCSL-03-01-T,
transcript from the Special Court of Sierra Leone. Available at http://www.scsldocs.org/.
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7.1 Background
The National Patriotic Front of Liberia formed to oppose President Samuel Doe.
After coming to power in a 1980 coup, Doe had brutally suppressed Thomas Quiwonkpa’s
attempt to overthrow him in 1985 and his regime increasingly terrorized its population.
Liberia’s population of approximately 2.5 million people covered at least 16 distinct ethnic
groups, who experienced low rates of literacy and high rates of unemployment (Ellis 2007,
133; Williams 2002, 32; Kieh 2008, 103). Although women’s rights varied among ethnic
groups and the rural–urban divide, Liberian society largely reflected male dominance
of economy and politics in what Kieh (2008) calls “hegemonic masculinity” (118). The
State Department estimates that before the war women had held a quarter of professional
and technical jobs in the capital city of Monrovia, yet in some rural areas the practice
of female genital mutilation was common (United States Department of State 1994 and
1995). Prior to the conflict, there were few protections in place against spousal abuse, and
the already low age of consent, thirteen, was seldom enforced (Kieh 2008, 120; Foster et
al. 2009, 253). The civil war begun by the NPFL caused the disintegration of the Liberian
government, leading to the emergence of rival factions who sought to claim control over
territory and resources in the power vacuum. In addition, the Economic Community Of
West African States intervened to prevent the spread of the conflict to other countries in
the region. Ceasefires in 1995 and 1996 attempted to establish a semblance of peace, but
the victory of Charles Taylor in the presidential election of 1997 signaled a temporary
end to the violence (Ellis 2007, 155). Between 1989 and 1996, approximately 200,000
Liberians died from direct and indirect effects of the war, while 700,000 became refugees
and approximately a million were internally displaced (Foster et al. 2009, 247; Reno 1998,
79).
The Non-State Actor Dataset codes the NPFL as having a moderate level of central
control and the highest possible level of military strength relative to the government, as
it was much stronger than the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). From 1990 onward the
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NPFL featured a military structure modeled after the United States’ armed forces with
an established training regiment, the ability to mete out harsh punishments, and a civil
administration, yet control was consolidated over time. Power was concentrated in the
figure of Charles Taylor, who could authorize the use of harsh disciplinary measures and
who periodically purged his command. There are reports of him personally monitoring
training, overseeing military operations from the field, and visiting the frontlines. Despite
the combination of a formidable fighting capacity and the NPRAG civil administration
that governed as much as 90 percent of Liberian at its peak, the group still faced problems
with control, information asymmetries, and factionalization. Thus, the NPFL represents
an especially strong rebel group that the model would predict to have high levels of
sexual violence. We see that although the SVAC codes no sexual violence for 1989–90,
the “post-conflict” period of 1991–95 had frequent sexual violence.2 There is substantial
evidence that this occurred in 1990 as well, which I discuss below (Foster et al. 2009,
240).
7.2 Hierarchy
In Table 5.2 I noted the essentialist argument that a strong hierarchy within rebel
groups may promote a traditional military culture, where power and masculinity are
linked, virility helps form the identity of the soldier, and masculinity is expressed by
suppressing “weak” traits like fear and empathy (Seifert 1994, 62–64). In this section
I argue that the structural dynamics of the NPFL, although deviating from traditional
U-form organization, encouraged a culture that promoted sexual violence. However,
tribal cultures influenced the expression of hierarchy as well, serving as a confound to the
positive relationship observed between strength and sexual violence.
2A score of two indicates that “sexual violence is likely related to the conflict,” is described in reports
as “widespread,” ”extensive,” ”regularly,” and related terms (Cohen and Nord˚as 2014).
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Figure 7.1: Map of Liberia and Key NPFL Cities
Figure from United Nations (2014).
The NPFL’s organizational control in its first year was at times precarious due to the
group’s rapid growth and the split of Prince Johnson’s INPFL faction. At the inception of
the conflict in late December 1989, the NPFL consisted of approximately 100 combatants
who had trained in Libya (Ellis 2007, 110). Prior to 1990 there was little formalized
structure to the group and some internal rivalry; Taylor attempted to assert his authority
as the leader and ensure the loyalty of his group by expelling a commander who tried to
take over the leadership and by securing salaries for his soldiers in training (Ellis 2007,
76; Lidow 2011, 172). After the NPFL crossed from Cote d’Ivoire into Nimba County and
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attacked Butuo, President Doe dispatched the undisciplined yet well-equipped AFL, who
raped and killed members of ethnic groups believed to be supporting Taylor (Williams
25). This carnage swelled the ranks of the NPFL with Gio and Mano recruits, some of
whom had already opposed the Doe government and resented the Krahn and Mandingo
communities in Nimba (Ellis 2007, 155; Ellis 1995, 166). “As the NPFL came in,” Charles
Taylor asserted to Bill Berkeley, “We didn’t even have to act. People came to us and
said, ’Give me a gun. How can I kill the man who killed my mother?’” (2001, 49). This
rapid increase in troop size caused growing pains, as demonstrated by Taylor changing
the top field commander five times in the first six months after the initial attack, and the
formally trained soldiers operating largely under Prince Johnson’s command. Therefore,
in the first year of the campaign, Taylor’s control over troops was undermined by the rapid
growth of the ranks, because the better fighters shifted to Prince Johnson’s increasingly
distinct chain of command and many new recruits engaged in looting and retaliation
killings rather than fighting the AFL (Ellis 2007, 78–82; Williams 2002, 86). At this early
stage, general abuses of the Krahn and Mandingo were driven by opposition to the Doe
regime and constituted retaliation against the AFL’s own brutal ethnic targeting, and a
structured control had not yet been established.
Once the group reached the suburbs of Monrovia in the summer of 1990 it began
strengthening its territorial control over the majority of Liberia,3 a more clear structure
formed, and Taylor could better consolidate authority and discipline members. Figure
7.2 shows the creation of four divisions—Army, Marines, Navy, and Executive Mansion
Guard—whose chiefs of staff reported to Taylor and each of which contained between two
and five battalions. Taylor tasked each division with specific territories and functions,
as I have outlined briefly in Figure 7.2, generally dividing operations between fighting
and providing security for resource extraction. With high revenues and loyal guards
at his disposal, Taylor maintained control of this structure in part through incentives,
3In 1990, the country was effectively divided between Monrovia and “Greater Liberia.” NPFL-
controlled territory was also often called “Taylorland.”
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Figure 7.2: Reported NPFL Military Command Structure
Figure based on page 175 in Lidow 2011.
and in part through fear. Many mid-tier commanders had risen quickly through the
ranks in 1990 due to the group’s rapid expansion and Taylor’s need to control hastily-
trained recruits. Taylor made these new commanders semi-dependent on him for supplies,
formally allowing looting for what he did not provide on the frontlines,4 and rewarded
those who followed commands with cash payments as large as 10–30,000 USD or the
promise of post-conflict benefits (Johnston 2008, 122; Lidow 2011, 176). On the other
hand, he ordered the execution of militarily ineffective top-tier commanders, such as
Cassius Jacobs—head of EMG Division from 1990–93—Putu Major, and James Kpehe
(Lidow 2011, 176). Recognizing the strategic importance of civilian support, though
admittedly selective about which civilian protections to enforce, Taylor would personally
4Looting was known as “Operation Pay Yourself.”
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resolve conflicts that arose when troops ignored NPRAG authority by either reassigning
to the frontlines or punishing commanders who “failed to provide security for civilians”
(Lidow 2011, 177).
To describe the NPFL’s military culture as masculine in the Western sense would
be reductive, although there were certain norms related to the group’s structure that
increased toleration of sexual violence. The group’s leadership embraced a culture of mil-
itarism through its official training program, the use of the U.S. Marine Corps’ “Eleven
General Principles of Leadership in this training,5 and the adoption of an extensive se-
ries of ranks that even applied to units, loosely-affiliated fighters, and those who helped
around camps (Lidow 2011, 178–79; Ellis 2007, 111). Several sources note the existence
of a military culture rooted in Hollywood’s depictions of violence and war in films like the
Rambo series, with combatants “attributing to themselves military ranks and grandiose
war names,”6 gaining reputations for the gruesome ways they abused civilians, and dis-
playing at roadblocks the skulls of those they had killed (Ellis 2007, 111; Lidow 2011,
182).
Nonetheless, Liberian spiritual practices complicated this Hollywood-like notion of
masculinity. Soldiers received spiritual protection during training and incorporated ele-
ments of various tribal practices in their attire that transcended gender binaries. Moran
(1995) argues that tribal rituals, once controlled by community elders, were appropriated
by Charles Taylor and other rebel leaders (41). Rituals in Poro and related “secret soci-
eties” for men often linked masculinity and violence, but male NPFL fighters were known
to wear masks, wedding gowns, makeup, and brightly-colored wigs into battle, mixing
feminine and masculine identities and “enacting their status as warriors” (Ellis 1995,
188; Moran 1995, 80; Waugh 2011, 54; Ellis 2007, 112). In addition, tribal notions and
celebrations of the warrior did not always exclude women, who were also expected to “be
5See https://marines.com/being-a-marine/leadership-principles for the full principles.
6Not all were grandiose. Many made vulgar and explicit references to sex or violence. Western media
especially relishes names like “General Fuck Me Quick” or “Babymaker” (Berkeley 2001, 23). Other
interesting names are “General Do or Die,” “CO Death,” “G.I. Joe,” and “Rambo” (Williams 2002, 15).
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brave and face pain and danger with courage” (Moran 1995, 40). Though women could
be combatants in the NPFL, they were also taken by combatants from their homes as
sexual slaves; bush wives, often in multiples, were ubiquitous within the NPFL from 1990
onward among all tiers of the hierarchy (Foster et al. 2009, 241). Taking multiple bush
wives represented a perversion of traditional polygyny common among various groups in
pre-war Liberian society, such as the large Kpelle tribe, turning a process that involved
the respect of families into one committed through forceful means (Bledsoe 1980). It is
worth noting that women served in a variety of roles within the NPFL hierarchy, volun-
tarily and involuntarily, and Pugel’s survey of former Liberian combatants suggests that
many of them served as combatants (2007). Still, the presence of female combatants does
not undermine the existence of a culture of masculinity, and some women among the
ranks had been brought into the the group originally as bush wives (Pugel 2007).
Masculinity within the NPFL therefore did not solely reflect the Western attributes
alluded to by Seifert (1994) but was influenced by Liberian spiritual practices as well that
at times incorporated elements of femininity. This was complicated by the various eth-
nicities represented in the NPFL and the heterogeneity of religious and cultural practices
within the Liberian tribes. Still, though defined in different terms than the Hollywood
movies that inspired young fighters, masculinity for all practical purposes was still linked
to the expression of violence. Although the NPFL represents a strong organization that
tolerated sexual violence because of established norms of masculinity, it does not seem
to be the case that it was the group’s strength in establishing a rigid military hierarchy
that generated this culture. Tribal and Western influences created a justification and tol-
eration for sexual violence that could be expressed by armed groups of men and women,
and in this way the hierarchy provided opportunities to release this violence. In addition,
it is difficult to distinguish the causal direction between hierarchy and cultural norms, as
we might imagine that egalitarian societies tend to produce more produce M-form orga-
nizations and that patriarchal societies produce more U-form organizations. A masculine
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culture in the NPFL did increase toleration for sexual violence, but it also seems directly
related to pre-war tribal customs. In these cases, I argue that norms may confound the
observed relationship between strength and sexual violence.
7.3 Weapon of War
The weapon of war mechanism in Table 5.1 notes the moderating capacity of
strength when there exists a strategic decision to commit sexual violence. The NPFL
was a large and capable fighting force with ample access to arms, and there was a high
incidence of sexual violence. However, I argue that categorizing the group’s sexual vio-
lence as a weapon of war simply because of its pervasiveness obscures the dynamics that
led to its frequent practice, and does not differentiate between sexual enslavement and
other forms of sexual violence. Combatants’ isolation from their families and communi-
ties, the impunity at checkpoints, the low percentage of men living in areas that rebels
overtook, and the military culture described previously all eroded constraints against
sexual violence. Specific orders to rape from Charles Taylor would have operated within
this paradigm, as did the frequent practice of using “bush wives” as sex slaves. While
there may or may not have existed an explicit policy of sexual violence, what this mecha-
nism does reveal about the relationship between strength and sexual violence is that the
power afforded to individual combatants and units by these dynamics removed constraints
against sexual violence.
The NPFL had high fighting and arms procurement capacities. At its peak, forces
numbered about 12,000 (Lidow 2011, 182). Charles Taylor had studied economics in
the United States and previously helped the Doe government create more centralized
economies of scale while directing a government procurement agency in the early 1980s
(Ellis 1995, 180; Reno 1998, 95). As head of the NPFL he created a personalized network
for obtaining arms, and funded it through relationships with logging firms, the export
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of diamonds and rubber, investing overseas, selling remaining capital and machinery in
areas the group took over, and manipulating exchange rates (Reno 1998). Estimates for
the group’s yearly revenues range between $75 and $250 million (Reno 1998, 99; Ellis
2007, 90).
Sexual violence may have served strategic functions, but I argue against applying
the “weapon of war” terminology in this context, as others have done. Within a weapon
of war framework, sexual violence is orchestrated and serves as a instrument to armed
conflict (Buss 2009). Generally this term refers to the conception of sexual violence as
well as its observance, meaning an organization both perceives it to be a policy and it
represents a pervasive phenomenon rather than isolated acts (Buss 2009; Niarchos 1995;
Seifert 1994). It also differentiates between the “by-products” and strategic effects of
war. In the case of the NPFL, incidence rates for a broad range of sexual violence were
undoubtedly high; combatants took sex slaves in the form of bush wives, engaged in rape
and gang rape, mutilated pregnant women, and sexually tortured civilians.7 During SCSL
trials there were contradictory testimonies concerning whether or not Taylor specifically
ordered rape in Liberia.8 Although he publicly denounced rape, he also restricted access
of NPRAG territory to NGOs or human rights groups, limiting the information we have on
its strategic employment (Libertas Humanitas 1991, 5). An IGNU report (1993) claimed
that ECOMOG intercepted radio messages in which Charles Taylor told commanders to
“kill all the men and rape all the women,” referring to internally displaced civilians in
NPFL territory (9). There is indeed some evidence that Taylor may have authorized
rape, and at the minimum he allowed to to occur nearly unchecked in spite of the official
line that prohibited it (Lidow 2011, 181; SCSL “Judgement” 2012, 346). All tiers of the
leadership tolerated the taking of bush wives, on the other hand.
7See especially the final report of the TRC of the Liberian Diaspora (Foster 2009), the final report of
the Liberian TRC, volume 3 (2009), and the State Department’s 1994 report.
8See trial transcripts from March 9, 2010 and March 13, 2008, for example.
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The weapon of war framework assigns blame to an organization’s command for
specifically authorizing policies that target civilians for a tactical advantage, which may
have been the case in the NPFL. However, while the group had a high fighting capacity
and sophisticated weaponry, it is only in combination with certain organizational norms
or relationships with civilians that these would be turned against civilians, and neither are
necessary for sexual violence. The practice of sexual slavery was pervasive, but did not
serve to inflict punishment on communities so much as to satisfy the greed and desire of
combatants. The opposite may be true of rape and sexual torture in this case. In general, I
would not equate a high prevalence with a group trying to gain strategic advantages from
sexual violence, nor commanders turning a blind eye with orders from the leadership.
To be sure, both the toleration and orchestration of sexual violence have devastating
effects on victims and Charles Taylor is culpable for the abuses committed by NPFL
combatants. However, assuming that all sexual violence was primarily a warfare tactic
obscures differences between the forms of it we can observe—particularly the ubiquity
of sexual enslavement—and downplays the conditions that decreased constraints against
its perpetration. Though Taylor may have ordered rape, his organization systematically
tolerated sexual enslavement, and so this mechanism offers little explanatory value for
the relationship between strength and sexual violence for this case.
7.4 Accountability
The first accountability mechanism asserts a mediating effect, where strength leads
a group to rely less on its constituency, so there are fewer incentives to restrain sexual
violence. I find some support for the first accountability mechanism from Table 5.1 in
this case, but the causal direction is not clear. Although partially dependent on their
territories for food, far-flung commanders had the capacity to forcibly recruit personnel.
Taylor relied on lumber, mining, and rubber exports of areas under his control, but the
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revenue generated from these activities led to a stronger fighting force. It seems that
because in Taylorland the NPFL already had a minimum level of strength—the capac-
ity to engage in these revenue-generating operations because of its control of roads and
ports—the opinions of the constituency mattered less so long as the group could main-
tain control of these networks. I argue, however, that the “garrisoned” mechanism best
explains the modeled relationship and the NPFL’s high propensity for sexual violence.
Commanders backed by the power of the gun took control of areas they had no prior ties
to, and this lack of civilian accountability in combination with Taylor’s sometimes spotty
monitoring capabilities in remote locations were conditions that decreased constraints on
the perpetration of sexual violence.
The first mechanism posits that strength reduces reliance on civilians, which may
manifest in more sexual violence. The NPFL’s relationship with its constituency was
nuanced, and informed both by strategy and the group’s composition. On the one hand,
civilians cooperated with the group out of fear and dependency, as combatants controlled
checkpoints and the shipment of food into Taylorland. As time went on, word of the
group’s brutality spread, which eroded the civilian support the group had held at the be-
ginning of the conflict as an alternative to the Doe government and an expression of the
Gio and Mano’s ethnic frustrations. Compared to the other rebel groups that emerged,
the NPFL was more ethnically diverse, drawing on the Bassa and Kpelle groups as well
as the Gio and Mano and thus was theoretically able to appeal to a larger portion of the
population (Lidow 2011, 257; Pugel 2007, 28).9 Nonetheless, the group still relied on ab-
duction and coercion to increase its ranks, and Pugel’s survey of former combatants notes
that 18 percent were abducted and 20 percent joined out of fear (2007, 36). Civilian co-
operation thus shifted from support to fear, varied across ethnicities, and was influenced
by the large degree of internal displacement. On the other hand, the general treatment
of civilians was still important for the NPFL and Taylor’s legitimacy and revenues, and
9However, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) find that in the Sierra Leone civil war ethnically hetero-
geneous groups were more likely to engage in civilian abuse.
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civilian cooperation facilitated resource extraction. For example, distributing rice in the
early years of the war and prior to the 1997 elections increased Taylor’s popularity, and
having large portions of the civilian population under his control increased his bargaining
position in negotiations in the early and mid 1990s. The NPRAG government contained
a police force and courts to settle disputes among civilians and an administration with
capable ministers selected by Taylor, and thus the relationship was not entirely preda-
tory (Lidow 2011, 177). Taylor recognized that looting had the ability to hurt commercial
production, so it was less prevalent and more likely to be punished in areas under terri-
torial control than on the frontlines (Ellis 2007, 143). Territorial losses to ULIMO, later
the ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K, and the LPC made economic productivity and civilian
suport in the areas remaining under NPFL influence even more important. Because the
NPFL had quickly established control over large portions of territory that provided it
with high revenues, it could recruit forces through fear and force, and it did. However,
this mechanism fails to account for the group’s courting of the civilian population and
the differential treatment of civilians at frontlines and in areas under control.
I find far more support for the second mechanism, which posits that strength, in
combination with locating groups of combatants far from their communities and families,
may lead to sexual violence. The NPFL purposefully deployed some combatants who had
victimized civilians to the frontlines, where abuses were more common and power unsta-
ble. Abuses were also more common in remote locations and checkpoints (Lidow 2011,
182–83). Despite the headquarter’s central location in Gbarnga, the NPFL acquired more
territory than it could monitor from the center, as communication and administration
could not keep pace with the initial expansion. This was exacerbated by Taylor’s distrust
of top-tier commanders and his preference for more direct channels of communication.
Territorial control also led to the establishment of checkpoints to regulate freedom of
movement of the population as well as detention centers, both of which became frequent
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sites of rape, beatings, and other abuses against civilians (Posner 1991, 2; State De-
partment 1993, 150). Notably, when combatants remained in areas for extended periods
of time, relations with civilians became less predatory (Lidow 2011, 183). The group’s
strength granted it access to a large portion of the country and resulted in the relocation
of combatants far from their home communities, creating the conditions for impunity.
Therefore, the second accountability mechanism provides a convincing explanation for
why strength corresponded with more sexual violence for the NPFL—it led to situations
that decreased fighters’ accountability to leaders and noncombatants.
7.5 Reporting Bias
There is no clear evidence that the NPFL’s strength led to overinflated estimates
in the SVAC. On the contrary, the dataset codes the NPFL’s 1990 observation as a 0,
but we have evidence for sexual enslavement and rape occurring in this year. As a former
NPFL commander confirmed in a conversation with me,10 bush wives were ubiquitous in
the NPFL from the outset of the war. Beyond the practice of taking bush wives, which
was not explicitly prohibited by the group, there is also evidence for rape in 1990 (Foster
et al. 2009, 240–48). A source report used to create the SVAC detailed the problem
of wartime rape, but did not clearly identify perpetrators of the sexual violence (State
Department 1990). The country’s instability at the outset made it difficult for outsiders
to access or to understand the various new factions operating within it. Another reporting
problem that existed was the difficulty in collecting information on the incidence of sex
slaves. These women remained firmly under the control of combatants as they were
brought into unfamiliar areas. Escape was not feasible, as the NPFL restricted freedom
of movement within its territory (Libertas Humanitas 1991, 2). Therefore, reporting
biases understated the group’s propensity for sexual violence in 1990. Testimonies from
human rights organizations and truth and reconciliation commissions support the SVAC’s
10The conversation with the former commander occurred March 23, 2016.
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coding for later years except for 1994, another example of reports not clearly identifying
the perpetrators of sexual violence (State Department 1994).11 This makes the case for
creating the dependent variable as I did in the quantitative analysis—using the maximum
value across the three sources—and reflects more generally the belief that wartime sexual
violence goes underreported (Wood 2010, 302).
The scale of warfare and inaccessibility of NPFL territory in the early stages of
fighting seems to have led to an underreporting of sexual violence in 1990, and it seems
unlikely that the State Department and Amnesty International reports overstated the
sexual violence that occurred between 1991 and 1995. It is not clear that group strength
impacted the reporting of sexual violence or that the coding for the conflict in general
only reflected a mechanical relationship between the size of rebel groups, as the sources
used to document sexual violence in 1991 through 1995 discuss the violent output of all
of the rebel groups in Liberia. In addition, this mechanism would be difficult to prove in
other cases, as ideally human rights violations from all conflicts are documented by state
or non-state actors and their perpetrators held accountable.
Finally, a reading through primary texts on the NPFL shows that the common
practice of describing sexual violence with euphemisms may also contribute to general
underreporting issues. On example comes from the Liberian newspaper Libertas Hu-
manitas, which reported human rights conditions under NPFL territories beginning in
1991. It published in August 1991 that “beautiful girls have been coerced into love re-
lationships and brainwashed into becoming [female fighters] by issuing them AK-47[s] or
other automatic rifles” (2). Similarly, the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU)
published a chronology of NPFL abuses in 1993, which alleges that “C.O. Devil” killed
three American nuns “after a brutal assault on their persons” (IGNU 1993, 7). It is not
certain that these specific examples imply sexual enslavement or rape, but such confusion
11The 1994 State Department report notes that “all warring factions regularly committed various forms
of torture and mistreatment of civilians, including individual and gang rape and other violence against
women.” This is not reflected in the SVAC because the NPFL was not listed by name.
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leads to difficulty in recording the incidence of sexual violence. Lethal forms of violence
are more easy to quantify and do not carry the same baggage of stigma and shame as
sexual violence does. Even when sexual violence is made known, euphemistic reporting
can decrease the accuracy with which we observe it.
7.6 Analysis
The case of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, a strong rebel group with a
high propensity for sexual abuses, sheds light on the positive relationship between the
degree of organizational control and the perpetration of sexual violence observed in the
quantitative analysis. Sexual violence in the form of rape, gang rapes, and sexual torture
and mutilation was effectively allowed to occur by the group’s hierarchy despite formal
prohibitions against rape. Sexual enslavement through combatants and commanders
taking “bush wives” was ubiquitous and influenced by pre-war polygyny practices and the
patriarchal society of Liberia. The pre-war status of women and prevalence of domestic
violence, the reinforcement of masculinity through violence, and the lack of governmental
or human rights monitoring may not be sufficient on their own to explain the propensity
for violence in the conflict, but in combination with the group’s territorial holdings the
picture becomes more clear. Sexual violence occurred most ostensibly in locations farther
from the monitoring capabilities of the center, either in geographical terms or in the
sense that it was difficult to enforce discipline on the frontlines of fighting. The NPFL’s
strength facilitated the group locating combatants in areas far from their families as the
group took over large portions of Liberia in the early years, and in the later years massive
numbers of internally displaced people restructured Liberian social ties. The group’s
strength also led to the establishment of detention centers and checkpoints where sexual
violence occurred with near impunity, and the ability of combatants to take single and
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married women as they pleased from their communities was facilitated by the power of
the gun.
Therefore, of the mechanisms proposed in Table 5.1 I find the most support for
the fourth, which posits that an increase in strength leads to a decrease in accountability
because the group tends to station its combatants further from the central leadership.
Relating to the first mechanism, it was not clear that the group’s hierarchy, as a function
of its strength, is what normalized violence, but seems more likely that preexisting tribal
norms influenced both the creation of the hierarchy and a group culture that promoted
violence as a way to increase cohesion. There’s also no clear evidence that sexual violence
in particular was perceived as a tactical weapon by the leadership, despite deliberate
killing of ethnic Krahn and Mandingo, and I argue that the weapon of war framework
in mechanism two draws away focus from the conditions that made sexual violence so
ubiquitous and obscures differences between the types of sexual violence used. The third
mechanism is useful for noting the tensions between NPFL’s civilian abuses and its de-
pendence on resource extraction from its territories. However, in this case it is not clear
that strength decreased reliance on social capital, because as negotiations and elections
neared the resilience of the group depended on its ability to win over civilians, and in
general the group’s financial success was predicated upon the resources in its territories
and the ability to maintain commercial links in those locations. The fifth mechanism on
reporting biases by its nature is difficult to prove or disprove. However, though the group
represented an uncommonly strong rebel group—able to take over 90 percent of Liberia
in six months and generate hundreds of millions of dollars yearly in revenues—in combi-
nation with lurid Western reports of the battle dress of and drugs taken by combatants,
sexual violence was still coded as a 0 for 1990 and 1994 in the SVAC. If even under these
conditions the dataset and other reports at the time underestimate sexual violence, we
should be concerned with underreporting in other conflicts too, and encourage both the
monitoring of human rights violations in active conflict zones and post-conflict measures
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to record and redress the phenomenon.
The NPFL case indicates that a rebel group’s strong organizational capabilities and
wealth can lead to conditions under which its combatants act increasingly independently
of the center, and with more impunity. This idea also makes sense when considering the
rampant sexual violence of NPFL fighters in Sierra Leone and even the sexual violence
perpetrated by peacekeeping missions (HRW 2016), suggesting that international and
non-governmental organizations acknowledge the risks in sending armed peacekeeping
groups to areas where they are not accountable to the civilian population, and look to
locations where domestic and foreign fighters lack ties to communities as they attempt to
mitigate the sexual violence of armed groups. More generally, this case calls for attention
to conditions that may decrease constraints on one-sided violence.
Chapter 8
Discussion and Conclusion
8.1 Discussion of Case Studies
The two case studies showed mixed results for the five mechanisms possibly me-
diating the relationship between sexual violence and strength, but the roles of pre-war
social dynamics and distance from the center were notable in each. For the weak group
without sexual violence, the All Tripura Tiger Force of India, I found the most evidence
for cultural norms impacting both the expression of hierarchy and the use of sexual vio-
lence. For the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, I found that strength led to situations
where combatants lacked accountability to the civilian population and the leadership,
which decreased the costs of raping or taking women as sex slaves.
Additionally, the quantitative analysis suggested that mobilizing capacity, unlike
the other ways I conceptualized and measured strength, was not significantly correlated
with sexual violence. In Tripura as well as Liberia these two rebel groups were initially
popular because of their ethnic appeals and promises to address recent marginalization,
but both began to face recruitment issues with the proliferation of competitor rebel groups
and the creation of fear among their respective constituencies. The NPFL had the ability
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to forcibly recruit to fill its ranks, maintaining control over territory through the ceasefires
of 1995 and 1996 and subsequently winning over the population in the 1997 elections, but
the ATTF decreased substantially in size and reduced its activities in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. Neither case indicates the effect of changing relationships with civilians on
sexual violence, but the NSA dataset’s measure of relative mobilization capacity could be
substituted in later studies by other proxies of civilian support to analyze this relationship.
The two cases also suggested that cultural norms impact both the expression of
hierarchy as well as sexual violence. This falls in line with a number of other theories
and studies that emphasize the impact of peacetime gender inequality on wartime vi-
olence (Brownmiller 1975; Seifert 1994; Hansen 2001). It should come as no surprise
that organizations do not emerge in a vacuum, as they are molded by cultural dynam-
ics, socioeconomic conditions, and political opportunities present prior to the war and
must respond in kind to changing circumstances. The quantitative analysis attempted
to control for some of these pre-war conditions, but the two case studies show that soci-
etal norms play an important role in sexual violence during conflicts. This is not to say
that wartime sexual violence merely reflects peacetime relations; rather, the differences
between the quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that there may be mechanisms
beyond those treated here that explain the positive correlation by incorporating cultural
norms. Mono-causal models are unlikely to explain variation in sexual violence across
groups and time, and recognizing the influence of strength and norms on its perpetration
may help solidify future theories.
Attempting to find the mechanism that best explained the relationship between
the independent and dependent variables in the case of the ATTF showed the difficulty
inherent in explaining the absence of a phenomenon. It also involved the assumption that
the case’s puzzle was the lack of sexual violence amidst other types of abuses. However,
scholars like Wood argue against the notion that rape is an inevitable by-product of war
or that we should have to explain its absence (2010). Its absence amidst a campaign
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of ethnic cleansing strengthens the justifications for analyzing sexual violence separately
from other forms of civilian abuse, yet a theoretical issue for later studies to address
remains whether we view the presence or absence of sexual violence as the puzzle, or
what conditions necessitate the use of one framework over the other (Cohen 2013a; Hoover
Green 2015). What my quantitative analysis and the case studies suggest is that it may
be more relevant to question the absence of sexual violence among strong groups and the
presence of sexual violence among weak groups, and to factor in gender inequalities and
accountability to civilians in each. Further studies on these types of cases could provide
more insight into the mechanisms underlying the relationship between the independent
and dependent variables.
The evidence in the NPFL case that favored the fourth mechanism, where condi-
tions of exclusive power and distance from the center result from a rebel group’s strength,
also raises an interesting question about the linear relationship proposed by the data anal-
ysis. The NPFL represented the strongest rebel group active between 1989 and 2009 ac-
cording to my methodology, yet they still faced significant information asymmetries and
difficulties imposing discipline that would have made reducing sexual violence difficult
should there have existed the political will among the leadership. Although the quantita-
tive results test a positive and linear relationship between strength and sexual violence,
it could be possible that once armed groups clear some threshold of strength their sexual
violence output decreases. It would furthermore be useful to test both rebel groups and
government forces with standardized measurements of strength to determine the sign on
sexual violence as the stronger rebel groups tend to assume more the characteristics of
the weaker governments.
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Table 8.1: Summary of Case Study Findings
ATTF (India) NFPL (Liberia)
Hierarchy Centralized hierarchy on paper but
not in practice. Tribal egalitari-
anism influenced both strength of
control and sexual violence. Norms
serve as a confound.
Evidence supports patriarchal cul-
tural norms increased the expres-
sion of violence, but culture may
have influenced hierarchy. Norms
serve as a confound.
Weapon of War An ethnic cleansing campaign
against Bengalis was present, with
a notable absence of sv that this
mechanism does not address.
High prevalence 6= strategy. Lead-
ership encouraged sexual enslave-
ment and did not effectively prose-
cute rape, but this mechanism does
not differentiate between the two.
Accountability
(i)
ATTF appealed to tribals, but
length of insurgency and number of
rival groups created a relationship
of fear. Little support for mecha-
nism.
NPFL still reliant on civilians.
Does not explain difference in sv





Bangladesh and carried out attacks
far from bases, but no reported sv
on either side of border.
Territorial control led to abuses at
checkpoints and detention centers.
Sv especially prevalent as combat-
ants entered new areas.
Reporting Bias Ample source material on attacks
suggests size did not necessarily
lead to underreporting, but incon-
clusive by nature.
Underreporting at beginning of
war. No evidence that size of NPFL
led to disproportionate ‘yes’ cod-
ings over other active rebel groups.
Summary Cultural norms discouraged sexual
violence and undermined attempts
of organizational control through
hierarchy. Norms served as a con-
found.
Sexual violence occurred far from
center in situations that increased
opportunity, decreased account-
ability, and manifested power im-
balances.
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8.2 Conclusion
Past scholarship has analyzed wartime sexual violence in the context of gender
relations, ethnic hatred, and opportunism at the systemic level. Many studies also have
focused on Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Sierra Leone, cases that represent outliers
in wartime uses of sexual violence. The Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset allows
for cross-national quantitative analysis of armed groups, so we can compare conflicts
where there was widespread sexual violence as well as where there was little or none.
It also allows us to spotlight the armed group, rather than the conflict, so that we can
explain why multiple rebel organizations in a single civil war perpetrate sexual violence
at such different levels. I chose to analyze the correlation of sexual violence with relative
strength, which represents a group’s ability to overcome the challenges to organization
and reflects key traits of its internal institutions.
This thesis used a unique cross-national analysis of rebel groups active between 1989
and 2009 to analyze this relationship between the strength of armed groups and the sex-
ual violence that they perpetrate. Previous theories of civilian abuses had suggested that
weaker and less cohesive groups have higher propensities for sexual violence, but my re-
gression analysis showed the opposite. Controlling for pre-war levels of state institutions,
the duration and intensity of conflicts, and the population of countries, stronger rebel
groups had higher propensities for sexual violence. A one standard deviation increase in
group strength suggested a 5 percent higher propensity for sexual violence.
The regression analysis could not show causality, so I proposed several mechanisms
that could mediate the observed relationship and tested them in exploratory case studies.
I argued that accountability moderates strength, and that stronger rebel groups are more
likely to send their combatants to locations that decrease constraints on sexual violence.
When located far from family in areas where they are not held accountable to civilians
or their leadership, combatants may engage in opportunistic sexual violence. On the
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other hand, weak groups are less likely to control territory or expand beyond their initial
recruitment base. This means they rely more heavily on noncombatants for support, are
less likely to enter areas with an unsympathetic constituency, and cannot act with the
same degree of impunity. I also found that cultural norms may serve as a confound,
affecting both the expression of hierarchy and the perpetration of sexual violence, but
this cannot fully explain the presence or absence of sexual violence by certain groups or
variation within conflicts.
The findings of this thesis speak to past scholarship on sexual violence. Most no-
tably, they challenge the assumption that it is undisciplined and loosely-organized rebel
groups who perpetrate the bulk of sexual violence. My case analyses suggest that oppor-
tunism is still key to the discussion, but that we should concentrate on the opportunism
within strong rebel groups that arises in situations that decrease combatant–civilian ties
and monitoring from the leadership. In addition, the quantitative analysis of mobilizing
capacity, defined as the ability of groups to recruit from the civilian population, neither
supported nor contradicted Cohen’s (2013a) argument that groups use sexual violence to
build unit cohesion. However, the NPFL case showed that the leadership appropriated
tribal rituals that emphasized violence, which may have been done to strengthen group
identity in an ethnically heterogeneous group. This thesis operationalized strength in a
way that deviated from Cohen’s emphasis on intra-group dynamics in the quantitative
analysis, but incorporating alternate measures of internal cohesion would be useful in
further studies. Finally, my findings suggest moving away from a paradigm that views
sexual violence as a tool of warfare. Although the positive correlation could support this
framework, I argue that it obscures the norms and accountability conditions that allow
sexual violence to occur at high levels. In addition, it offers little explanation for why
the majority of rebel groups do not perpetrate sexual violence, or why groups use some
forms of sexual violence and not others.
A key theoretical question is whether we need to explain the absence or presence
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of sexual violence. This thesis proposes that we should frame this question by keeping
group strength and other organizational characteristics in mind. The puzzle suggested
by my findings is why weak groups who are dependent on the civilian population some-
times perpetrate high amounts of sexual violence, and why strong groups who are not
as accountable to their constituency may refrain from doing so. The answer may in-
volve reporting issues as well as societal gender inequalities, or there could be factors not
addressed in this analysis that also influence sexual violence perpetration.
My findings hold notable policy implications. The quantitative analysis suggests
that human rights groups should continue to monitor militarily and organizationally
strong rebel groups. The case studies show that we should pay particular attention to
armed groups garrisoned far from their communities and families. Here I only analyzed
armed groups of rebels in wartime scenarios, but any group of men who can threaten vi-
olence and operate with limited accountability may have higher propensities for violence.
This could apply to India’s security forces deployed to the remote state of Tripura, who
committed sexual violence against civilians when the ATTF and other tribal insurgencies
did not. For a more recent example, this could pertain to battalions of United Nations
peacekeepers, who in 2015 gang-raped women and girls in the Central African Republic
(HRW 2016). Even in peacetime societies that prohibit the use of violence against un-
armed citizens, if police forces are not representative of the populations they serve and
are not held accountable by their superiors, there are fewer constraints against commit-
ting one-sided violence against citizens (DOJ 2015). This thesis suggests that wartime
sexual violence is not inevitable and that it does not vary directly with other forms of
civilian abuses. Future scholars and policymakers should probe other organizational char-
acteristics that may affect a group’s propensity for sexual violence. Survivors of sexual
violence may face diseases, an increased risk for suicide, stigma, unwanted pregnancies,
and lifelong psychological trauma; recognizing where distinctive risks to women exist in




It is important to note possible selection biases to the sample of data used in the
correlations above that might come from location and the age of the rebel group.
Variables drawn from the Non-State Actors Dataset are more likely to be missing
for African groups than for rebel groups from any other region; as Table A.1 shows,
for the nine covariates tested on sexual violence, data is missing for 77.3 percent of
African rebel groups, though they account for 41.3 percent of the rebel groups in this
dataset. To examine this further, I performed a chi-squared test of independence that
suggested a significant relationship between the region in which rebel groups operated
and missingness, chi2 (4, N=208) = 14.09, p < .01.
It seems probable that it is more difficult to collect information on short-lived rebel
movements. To quickly proxy this, I calculate the number of years in which rebel groups
appear in this dataset, although this is an imperfect measurement because the dataset
arbitrarily begins in 1989 and there is a slight decrease in the number of observations
per year over time. Still, because rebel groups appear in this dataset for an average of
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Table A.1: Rebel Groups Missing by Region
Region Non-Missing Missing Total
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
Africa 69 37.1 17 77.3 86 41.3
Americas 17 9.1 1 4.5 18 8.7
Asia 59 31.7 1 4.5 60 28.8
Europe 20 10.8 2 9.1 22 10.6
Middle East 21 11.3 1 4.5 22 10.6
Total 186 100.0 22 100.0 208 100.0
Pearson chi2(4) = 14.0940 Pr = 0.007
Table A.2: Propensity for SV Controlling for Troop Size: Multiple Imputation Results
Dependent Variable: sv
VARIABLE (Sexual Violence Indicator)
Strength Index 0.0567
(0.0222)**




















F (9, 58.9) 2.76
Prob >F 0.0093
MI regression supports previous OLS results
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3: Propensity for Sexual Violence at Group-Year Level: Probit Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Dependent Variable: Indicator for Sexual Violence
Strength Index 0.273
(0.101)***
Central Control 0.0816 0.0498
(0.175) (0.173)
Territorial Control 0.458 0.377
(0.235)* (0.267)
Relative Strength 0.340 0.256
(0.147)** (0.160)
Logged GDP/cap -0.460 -0.462 -0.424 -0.408 -0.419
(0.167)*** (0.178)*** (0.163)*** (0.169)** (0.165)**
Political Institutions 0.304 0.301 0.322 0.316 0.336
(0.348) (0.354) (0.335) (0.388) (0.347)
Executive Constraints 0.0893 0.0867 0.102 0.0804 0.0939
(0.0720) (0.0726) (0.0707) (0.0732) (0.0715)
Intensity 0.525 0.451 0.447 0.431 0.416
(0.202)*** (0.192)** (0.198)** (0.200)** (0.199)**
Logged Population -0.393 -0.396 -0.322 -0.348 -0.341
(0.0809)*** (0.0786)*** (0.0803)*** (0.0831)*** (0.0806)***
Missing -0.121 -0.179 -0.157 -0.104 -0.155
(0.205) (0.208) (0.210) (0.202) (0.209)
Constant 4.477 4.556 4.161 4.012 3.836
(1.662)*** (1.690)*** (1.596)*** (1.578)** (1.642)**
Observations 947 980 982 946 982
Table supports OLS results
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by actor
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.73 years (SD = 5.32) and 51.44 percent of groups are active in this dataset for only one
or two years, I continue with an unpaired t-test. Results indicate that “missing groups”
had a lower mean year count (M = 1.95, SD = 1.94), than did groups who were not
missing data for these organizational variables (M = 5.06, SD = 5.49), t(206) = 2.62, p
=.009. For this reason, the sample may underrepresent the sexual violence perpetrated
by short-lived rebel groups.
To ensure that the dependent variable is not coded to favor larger groups, I control
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for troop size estimates. Nearly 20 percent of force sizes were missing from the Non-State
Actors Dataset, so I use multiple imputation to correct for this in Table A.2. With 20
imputations, 40 out of 41 data points can be imputed, and the results from Table 4.1 are
supported by this check.
Table A.3 shows the results of probit regression models for the group-year approach.
The results support the direction of the relationship posited in Table 4.2. As group
strength increases by one standard deviation, the group’s propensity for sexual violence
in a given year rises by 27 percent.
A.2 Constitution of ATTF (India)
Note: This maintains the translation found on the South Asia Terrorism Portal, with
only limited formatting adjustments and corrections for typographical errors. While
not perfect English, the version shown on the SATP and replicated below still paints a
relatively clear picture of the ATTF drafter’s intentions.
Article No. 1
Force will be recognised as “All Tripura Tiger Force”.
Article No. 2
(i) Under the constitution of India for existence of 19 point interest of Tribals and for integrity of land,
all strength will be utilised for arms struggle without any compromise. This will be the main object of
the force.
(ii) Force will fight against all sorts of torture, squeeze, oppression upon main tribal stream.
(iii)Force will fight for fulfilment and application of all sorts of decision accepted in the Indian Parliament.
(iv) Force will not accept any sort of amendment of constitution which goes against the interest of main
tribal stream.
(v) Seven sister States of North-East, viz. Tripura, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Arunachal
Pradesh, Meghalaya will form a separate country and for this, the force will support all sorts of movement
and will utilise their own force for the purpose.
(vi) Force will fight without any compromise for the existence of tribal own culture and against distorted
culture.
(vii) Force will refrain all tribal people from taking liquor, ganja. drugs etc. and for this force will light
without any compromise.
Liquor can only be taken by the tribals in marriage ceremony and social functions.
(viii) Force will light against playing cards and gambling.
Article No. 3: Responsibilities and duties
(i) Duties and responsibilities of each member of the force will be to struggle for fulfilment of all consti-
tutional rights of main tribals of Tripura.
(ii) Each of the force member will abide by the order of their superiors and will work with full responsi-
bilities.
(iii) Duty and responsibility of all force member will be to address his superiors by calling ’SIR’ &
’SHAB’.
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(iv) Main object of the force will be fight against squeeze, torture, oppression upon tribals and for struggle
for their freedom.
(v) Force will fight unconditionally for the right, existence and power of minority tribals and to get rid
of those who are oppressed.
Article No. 4: Right and Relation
(i) All the members of the force will have right to enjoy constitutional facilities and rights.
(ii) Each of the member will have right to disclose their respective opinion to their superiors and also
have the right to give and take advice.
(iii) Each of the force member at the time of operation will keep sweet relation with common innocent
people and should have to behave politely with them.
Article No. 5: Law and power
(i) Each of the force member shall abide by the rules of the constitution and decision. They shall I also
carry out lawful direction of their superiors.
(ii) Each member of the force will enjoy powers given the constitution.
(iii) If any member of the force have any complaint against his superior, he will have the right to lodge
written complaint against them through proper channel.
(iv) members will maintain secrecy of the decisions of the Organisation. No member shall maintain any
personal privacy about organisational matters.
(v) No member shall take part in any operation after taking liquor. Taking of liquor by any force member
is totally restricted.
(vi) If any member acts against this constitution or force at the time of operation, the duty officer will
be the man to impose punishment against him.
(vii) Each member of the force will exercise all power and strength in the interest of the tribal people.
(viii) Each member must follow and abide by the decision of the Executive Committee.
(ix) With the advice and decision of the Executive Committee, President will make law and procedure
and President will be considered to be supreme authority of the force.
(x) President will make scrutiny of all loopholes of the force with the advice of the Executive body
members.
(xi) In absence of President, Vice-President will take any type of decision and function like President.
In absence of both of them. Secretary General/Commander-in-chief will function in the office.
(xii) To pay respect to the superiors and regards to each member of the force will be the responsibility
of each of the force member.
(xiii) It is mandatory to carry operational works in different areas with the advise of the intelligence
wing of the force.
Article No. 6: Discipline and Restrictions
(i) Each member of the force is bound to bound to abide by the discipline and restriction of the organi-
sation.
(ii) No torture will be made upon any women of the community.
(iii) In no circumstances, child, pregnant lady. Saint, Priest, Baishnab and Pastor can be killed with any
plea.
(iv) With any plea attack cannot be made or fire will not be set in any temple. Church, Mosque, Asram
(Place of worship) and Hospital.
(v) It will be the duty of each member of the force to maintain discipline of the force.
(vi) At the time of operation without the order from the duty officer, no subscription will be collected
nor any sort of attack will be made.
(vii) No political leader can be killed on any personal enmity. It will be beyond the rule of the organisation.
(viii) No member of the force will do anything as per wrong direction or abetment of any person illegally.
(ix) Printed pad of the force will not be used for any personal purpose. Officer and Executive body
member are entitled to use printed pad. There should not be any misuse of seal of the organisation.
(x) Without the knowledge of the appropriate authority none is allowed to give any direction or advice
to any leader of the organisation.
Article No. 7: Appointment and Dismissal
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(i) Executive body members are vested with the power to appoint, without decision and approval, there
will be no recruitment
(ii) Before recruitment courage, efficiency, personality, firmness of each youths to be taken into consid-
eration.
(iii) Before recruitment identity of the youth to be properly verified and established. Generally youths
between the age of 20 and 30 will be considered for appointment.
(iv) If any Ex-Army man express his willingness to join this force, he will be appointed.
(v) After training and taking of oath identity card will be given to the member of the force.
(vi) One member of the force will be considered dismissed for misuse of responsibility, direction, law,
character, discipline and power.
(vii) Efficiency, courage and sensibility of one member will be taken into consideration for promotion.
(viii) One may be transferred to any place.
Article No. 8: Public Relation
(i) Each member will be able to keep good relation with common people. In this respect law of the force
should not disobeyed.
(ii) Common innocent people will have the right to lodge complaint in writing to the higher authority of
The organisation against the force.
(iii) Duty Officer is bound to accept any written complaint of general people.
Article No. 9: Punishment rules
(i) Every member shall be punished for negligency of responsibility, rules, discipline etc.
(ii) Every member shall be punished for misuse of power.
(iii) Every member shall be punished for avoiding direction of higher authority.
(iv) Every member shall be punished or misuse of pad, seal of the organisation.
Article No. 10: Character and Behaviour
(i) Every member should be honest and idealistic.
(ii) One should not talk angrily with anybody.
(iii) One should not maintain any illicit connection with any woman after joining the force.
(iv) One member should not misbehave. No one shall be punished for misbehaviour.
Article No. 11: Contribution and Membership Collection Process
(i) Executive Committee shall take timely decision the procedure to collect annual subscription.
(ii) Subscription to be collected from Tripuri people according to family income. No atrocities, bargaining
is permitted.
(iii) 15 percent to 30 percent subscription be taken from the Govt. contractors against each estimated
works.
(iv) Against collection of subscription all sorts of technique, force etc. be applied.
(v) It is mandatory of be enrolled as membership against payment of 10/-. Renewal of membership be
done every year.
(vi) Original membership will not be allotted except subjects of the man of the soil.
Article No. 12: Structure
(i) All from President to Major will be the member of General Committee. The working Committee will
be formed having nine members.
(ii) The working committee will be structured after forming of Central Committee. One will be selected
after formation of central committee. He will be supreme powerful one amongst above all.
(iii) The President will distribute the responsibility of each department of executive members according
to his choice and discretion.
(iv) The President can take the extreme decision of the force in case of any emergent affairs.
(v) General meeting of the Central Committee will be held in an interval of three months. In case of
necessity the meeting may be held once within the period 15/30 days.
(vi) The elected Tripuri women appointed to collect information/intelligence for the welfare of organisa-
tion and also to maintain link of communication.
(vii) There will be two regiment in the organisation. One will be named as Bir Bikram Regiment and
another as Borok Regiment.
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(viii) The President or Secretary General will call general meetings. It will be mandatory rule according
to law to issue letter arising out of any meeting before 25 days from the date to be fixed for such meeting.
(ix) The organisation will be formed in the following manner:
(A) The unit will be formed having seven member. Every unit will be consisted by one unit major.
The unit major will be the supreme to run the unit. 5 to 15 Panchayet will be under his command of
control. There will be one Havildar to assist him. Unit Major will be crowned with one star.
(B) The zone area will be formed, having three units. One Zone Commander will be in each zone.
He will be supreme authority to run the zone. He can advice and direct all unit in respect of any work.
Unit Majors will assist the Zone Commander and also extend suggestions. The Zone Commander will
hold responsibility to run any department. He will be crowned with two stars.
(C) The Company will be formed consisting with 2/3 Zones. There will be one Commander/Ma-
jor/Captain to run the company. He will control two zone. He may suggest and take decision relating
to important affairs of the zone. He will be crowned with three stars or emblem. He will control 2/3
departments.
(D) A battalion will be formed taking with three companies. There shall be one commanding
Officer for its controlling, He will be empowered to control a District. He will be able to take any
decision for controlling his zone. He will be crown with one emblem and one star.
(E) Commander-in-Chief will control all District and Regiment of the force. He will be supreme
in the force. He may take any important decision pertaining the force under his control. He will look
after appointment, dismissal, training, promotion etc. of the force. He will bring notice of the President
of the Organisation regularly relating to all important aspects.
Article No. 13: Dress
(i) The classification of dress will be jungle dress or olive green colourful shirt and full pant with same
coloured cap.
(ii) All will be dressed with hunter Shoes, Belt, Badge and Whistle.
(iii) According to situations dress may be changed.
(iv) Every member will get one pair shirt; one pair pant once in a year. Hunter shoe and belt will be
issued once in a year.
Article No. 14: Flag and Symbol
(i) The flag will be coloured as green base with red colour organisation symbol. The measurement of the
flag will be 3 :2.
(ii) In case if need the symbol of the flag with its colour will be changed.
Article No. 15: Constitution Amendment
(i) Without decision of General Committee in no circumstances any partial amendment cannot be changed
or be included or to be included. Provided in case of special circumstances and in acute need, the working
committee amend the constitution.
A.3 Data Modifications
Table 3.1 provided summary statistics for all major variables used in the quantita-
tive analysis. Table A.4 details modifications made in the coding of variables that were
merged together. In addition, for the selection of 208 rebel groups used in this analysis,
observations were dropped for which data did not exist for both the NSA and SVAC
dataset. For group-years when NSA data changed in the middle of the year, the obser-
vation reflects the measurement at the beginning of the year. If only the NSA coded a
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conflict-year as active, but the SVAC had “interim” data available for the year, the year
is included. If a rebel group became a pro-government militia for a single year (RUF in
1997), it is also included in this dataset.
Table A.4: Data Modifications Performed
Variable Name Source
Comments
Sexual Violence (sv2 )
Cohen and
Nord˚as 2014
Variable takes the value of 1 for a year if
any of SVAC’s three sources (state prev, ai prev,
hrw prev) are greater than 0. Variable takes 0 if








Previously strengthcent measured (1, 3) only for
observations where a central control existed. Re-




Changed rebstrength from string to ordinal mea-
sure. Much weaker (-2), weaker (-1), parity (0),
stronger (1), much stronger (2).
Logged GDP/cap Gleditsch 2002
Missing cgdppc values for Azerbaijan, Georgia,





Values reflect rpe agri. When missing, values re-
flect rpe gdp (Liberia). Fixed Serbia and Yemen.
Executive Constraints Polity IV
Replaced xconst (3.4) with 1 if -77 (interreg-
num/anarchy) and with 4 if -66 (transition).
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A.4 Sexual Violence of Rebel Groups, 1989–2009
The following tables are derived from the subset of 208 rebel groups used in the
quantitative analysis. Tables A.5 and A.6 show groups without observed sexual violence
between 1989–2009, sorted in alphabetical order by country. Table A.7 lists all groups
with observed sexual violence, the average number of conflict years the group employed
it, the normalized strength index of the organization, and the number of active conflict
years per rebel group.
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Table A.5: Groups without Reported Sexual Violence 1989–2009
actor location actor location
Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami Afghanistan FMLN El Salvador
Mil. faction (Tanay) Afghanistan EIJM - AS Eritrea
Taleban Afghanistan ARDUF Ethiopia
UIFSA Afghanistan EPLF Ethiopia
AIS Algeria EPRDF Ethiopia
AQIM Algeria Mil. faction (Desta, Negusie) Ethiopia
GIA Algeria OLF Ethiopia
Takfir wa’l Hijra Algeria ONLF Ethiopia
FLEC-FAC Angola al-Itahad al-Islami Ethiopia
FLEC-R Angola Nat. Guard, Mkhedrioni Georgia
Military faction (Husseinov) Azerbaijan Republic of Abkhazia Georgia
OPON forces Azerbaijan Zviadists Georgia
JSS/SB Bangladesh URNG Guatemala
APWB BIH RFDG Guinea
CNDD Burundi FLRN Haiti
Frolina Burundi Mil. faction (Rebu, Francois) Haiti
Palipehutu Burundi OP Lavalas (Chimres) Haiti
CPJP CAR ABSU India
AN Chad ATTF India
CNR Chad CPI-M India
CSNPD Chad DHD-BW India
FARF Chad KCP India
FNT Chad KNF India
FUCD Chad Kashmir Insurgents India
Islamic Legion Chad MCC India
MDD Chad NDFB India
MDJT Chad NDFB - RD India
MOSANAT Chad NLFT India
MPS Chad NSCN - IM India
Mil. faction (Bada Abbas) Chad PLA India
RAFD Chad PREPAK India
Rev. Forces of 1 April Chad PULF India
UFDD Chad PWG India
UFR Chad Sikh insurgents India
EPL Colombia ULFA India
MPA/Republic of Anjouan Comoros UNLF India
Presidential guard Comoros Fretilin Indonesia
Ninjas Congo Jondullah Iran
FN CIV KDPI Iran
MJP CIV MEK Iran
BDK DRC PJAK Iran
FRUD - AD Djibouti KDP Iraq
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya Egypt PUK Iraq
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Table A.6: Groups without Reported Sexual Violence 1989–2009 (Continued)
actor location actor location
SCIRI Iraq Military faction (Rodriguez) Paraguay
AMB Israel MRTA Peru
Fatah Israel CPP Philippines
Hamas Israel MILF Philippines
Hezbollah Israel MNLF Philippines
PFLP Israel MNLF-HM Philippines
PFLP-GC Israel MNLF-NM Philippines
PIJ Israel Military faction (Honasan) Philippines
PRC Israel NSF Romania
LRM Laos APF Russia/USSR
INPFL Liberia Forces of the Caucasus Emirate Russia/USSR
NPFL Liberia Parliamentary forces Russia/USSR
ATNMC Mali Republic of Armenia Russia/USSR
FIAA Mali Wahhabi mvmt, Buinaksk Russia/USSR
MPA Mali FDLR Rwanda
EPR Mexico Croatian irregulars Serbia
EZLN Mexico Republic of Croatia Serbia
POLISARIO Morocco Republic of Slovenia Serbia
ABSDF Myanmar SNM Somalia
ARIF Myanmar SPM Somalia
BMA Myanmar SRRC Somalia
God’s army Myanmar ETA Spain
KIO Myanmar JVP Sri Lanka
KNPP Myanmar NDA Sudan
MTA Myanmar NRF Sudan
NMSP Myanmar SLM/A-Unity Sudan
RSO Myanmar Movement for Peace in Tajikistan Tajikistan
UWSA Myanmar UTO Tajikistan
Contras/FDN Nicaragua Patani insurgents Thailand
CRA Niger Jamaat al-Muslimeen Trin. & Tob.
FDR Niger Devrimci Sol Turkey
FLAA Niger MKP Turkey
MNJ Niger PKK Turkey
UFRA Niger UNRF II Uganda
Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa Nigeria UPA Uganda
Boko Haram Nigeria WNBF Uganda
NDPVF Nigeria PIRA UK
BLA Pakistan RIRA UK
Baluch Ittehad Pakistan IMU Uzbekistan
MQM Pakistan JIG Uzbekistan
TNSM Pakistan Mil. faction (Hugo Chavez) Venezuela
TTP Pakistan AQAP Yemen
Mil. fact. (Giroldi) Panama Dem. Rep. of Yemen Yemen
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CNDD-FDD Burundi 0.666 -0.369 6
Palipehutu-FNL Burundi 0.916 -0.122 12
Forces of Francois Bozize CAR 1.000 0.124 1
ELN Colombia 0.095 0.053 21
FARC-EP Colombia 0.380 0.406 21
MPCI Cote d’Ivoire 1.000 1.252 1
MPIGO Cote d’Ivoire 1.000 0.300 2
CNDP DRC 1.000 0.899 3
FRUD Djibouti 0.250 1.005 4
Republic of South Ossetia Georgia 0.333 0.652 3
Mil. faction (Cedras) Haiti 1.000 0.582 1
GAM Indonesia 0.111 0.899 9
PNA Israel 0.500 -0.122 4
LURD Liberia 0.750 -0.122 4
MODEL Liberia 1.000 0.652 1
Renamo Mozambique 0.500 1.005 4
KNU Myanmar 0.095 0.547 21
SSA-S Myanmar 0.285 0.300 14
CPN-M Nepal 0.363 0.652 11
BRA Pakistan 0.200 0.709 10
Sendero Luminoso Peru 0.142 -0.228 14
ASG Philippines 0.058 -0.475 17
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Russia/USSR 0.083 0.406 12
MFDC Senegal 0.500 0.159 14
UCK Serbia 0.666 0.441 3
AFRC Sierra Leone 1.000 0.230 3
Kamajors Sierra Leone 1.000 0.230 2
RUF Sierra Leone 0.800 0.652 10
USC Somalia 0.500 -0.722 2
USC/SNA Somalia 0.166 1.252 6
LTTE Sri Lanka 0.047 0.899 21
SLM/A - MM Sudan 1.000 0.406 1
SPLM/A Sudan 0.812 0.652 16
ADF Uganda 0.500 -0.152 8
LRA Uganda 0.714 0.124 21
Note: SV represents the percentage of conflict years with sexual violence.
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